linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] perf/core: generate overflow signal when samples are dropped (WAS: Re: [REGRESSION] perf/core: PMU interrupts dropped if we entered the kernel in the "skid" region)

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Message-ID: <20170629081233.7muy7k447pc5njmg@gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 29 Jun 2017 10:12:33 +0200
From:   Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
To:     Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Cc:     Kyle Huey <me@...ehuey.com>,
        Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@...ne.edu>,
        "Jin, Yao" <yao.jin@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org,
        Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>,
        Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
        Stephane Eranian <eranian@...gle.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, acme@...nel.org,
        jolsa@...nel.org, kan.liang@...el.com,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org,
        Robert O'Callahan <robert@...llahan.org>,
        open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] perf/core: generate overflow signal when samples are
 dropped (WAS: Re: [REGRESSION] perf/core: PMU interrupts dropped if we
 entered the kernel in the "skid" region)


* Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com> wrote:

> It still seems wrong to make up data, though.

So what we have here is a hardware quirk: we asked for user-space samples, but 
didn't get them and we cannot expose the kernel-internal address.

The question is, how do we handle the hardware quirk. Since we cannot fix the 
hardware on existing systems there's really just two choices:

 - Lose the sample (and signal it as a lost sample)

 - Keep the sample but change the sensitive kernel-internal address to something 
   that is not sensitive: 0 or -1 works, but we could perhaps also return a 
   well-known user-space address such as the vDSO syscall trampoline or such?

there's no other option really.

I'd lean towards Vince's take: losing samples is more surprising than getting the 
occasional sample with some sanitized data in it.

If we make the artificial data still a meaningful user-space address, related to 
kernel entries, then it might even be a bonus, as users would learn to recognize 
it as: 'oh, skid artifact, I know about that'.

Thanks,

	Ingo