linux-kernel - Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption

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Message-ID: <6273a2f0-151a-e8c2-6f4c-09d397446128@amd.com>
Date:   Tue, 25 Jul 2017 09:59:21 -0500
From:   Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
To:     Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Cc:     brijesh.singh@....com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        x86@...nel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
        linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
        Piotr Luc <piotr.luc@...el.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>,
        Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com>,
        Reza Arbab <arbab@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
        Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
        Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Dave Airlie <airlied@...hat.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
        Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure
 Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption



On 07/25/2017 12:45 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 02:07:41PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> 
> Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption
> 													 ^^^^^^^^^^
> 
> Please introduce a spellchecker into your workflow.
> 
>> Update amd-memory-encryption document describing the AMD Secure Encrypted
> 
> "Update the AMD memory encryption document...
> 
> The patch has the proper URL already.
> 
>> Virtualization (SEV) feature.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
>> ---
>>   Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>>   1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
>> index f512ab7..747df07 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
>> +++ b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
>> @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
>> -Secure Memory Encryption (SME) is a feature found on AMD processors.
>> +Secure Memory Encryption (SME) and Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) are
>> +features found on AMD processors.
>>   
>>   SME provides the ability to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted using
>>   the standard x86 page tables.  A page that is marked encrypted will be
>> @@ -6,6 +7,12 @@ automatically decrypted when read from DRAM and encrypted when written to
>>   DRAM.  SME can therefore be used to protect the contents of DRAM from physical
>>   attacks on the system.
>>   
>> +SEV enables running encrypted virtual machine (VMs) in which the code and data
> 
> 					 machines
> 
>> +of the virtual machine are secured so that decrypted version is available only
> 
> ... of the guest VM ...		  ... so that a decrypted ...
> 
>> +within the VM itself. SEV guest VMs have concept of private and shared memory.
> 
> 				 	have *the* concept - you need to use
> 					definite and indefinite articles in your
> 					text.
> 
>> +Private memory is encrypted with the guest-specific key, while shared memory
>> +may be encrypted with hypervisor key.
> 
> And here you explain that the hypervisor key is the same key which we
> use in SME. So that people can make the connection.
> 
>> +
>>   A page is encrypted when a page table entry has the encryption bit set (see
>>   below on how to determine its position).  The encryption bit can also be
>>   specified in the cr3 register, allowing the PGD table to be encrypted. Each
>> @@ -19,11 +26,20 @@ so that the PGD is encrypted, but not set the encryption bit in the PGD entry
>>   for a PUD which results in the PUD pointed to by that entry to not be
>>   encrypted.
>>   
>> -Support for SME can be determined through the CPUID instruction. The CPUID
>> -function 0x8000001f reports information related to SME:
>> +When SEV is enabled, certain type of memory (namely insruction pages and guest
> 
> When SEV is enabled, instruction pages and guest page tables are ...
> 
>> +page tables) are always treated as private. Due to security reasons all DMA
> 
> security reasons??
> 
>> +operations inside the guest must be performed on shared memory. Since the
>> +memory encryption bit is only controllable by the guest OS when it is operating
> 
> 		     ... is controlled ...
> 
>> +in 64-bit or 32-bit PAE mode, in all other modes the SEV hardware forces memory
> 
> 								... forces the memory ...
> 
>> +encryption bit to 1.
>> +
>> +Support for SME and SEV can be determined through the CPUID instruction. The
>> +CPUID function 0x8000001f reports information related to SME:
>>   
>>   	0x8000001f[eax]:
>>   		Bit[0] indicates support for SME
>> +	0x800001f[eax]:
> 
> There's a 0 missing and you don't really need it as it is already above.
> 
>> +		Bit[1] indicates support for SEV
>>   	0x8000001f[ebx]:
>>   		Bits[5:0]  pagetable bit number used to activate memory
>>   			   encryption
>> @@ -39,6 +55,13 @@ determine if SME is enabled and/or to enable memory encryption:
>>   		Bit[23]   0 = memory encryption features are disabled
>>   			  1 = memory encryption features are enabled
>>   
>> +If SEV is supported, MSR 0xc0010131 (MSR_F17H_SEV) can be used to determine if
> 
> If this MSR is going to be part of the architecture - and I really think
> it is - then call it MSR_AMD64_SEV.
> 

Thanks Boris, I'll update the doc per your feedbacks. And will rename the MSR to
MSR_AMD64_SEV.

-Brijesh