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Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2017 07:47:53 -0700
From: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] KVM: VMX: cache secondary exec controls
On Thu, Aug 24, 2017 at 6:37 AM, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com> wrote:
> Currently, secondary execution controls are divided in three groups:
>
> - static, depending mostly on the module arguments or the processor
> (vmx_secondary_exec_control)
>
> - static, depending on CPUID (vmx_cpuid_update)
There should also be:
- static, depending on guest VMX capability MSRs (vmx_set_vmx_msr)
>
> - dynamic, depending on nested VMX or local APIC state
>
> Because walking CPUID is expensive, prepare_vmcs02 is using only
> the first group. This however is unnecessarily complicated. Just
> cache the static secondary execution controls, and then prepare_vmcs02
> does not need to compute them every time. Computation of all static
> secondary execution controls is now kept in a single function,
> vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control.
>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
> 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> index 19aa69af7c2d..08381a5d8879 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> @@ -576,6 +576,8 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
> #endif
> u32 vm_entry_controls_shadow;
> u32 vm_exit_controls_shadow;
> + u32 secondary_exec_control;
> +
> /*
> * loaded_vmcs points to the VMCS currently used in this vcpu. For a
> * non-nested (L1) guest, it always points to vmcs01. For a nested
> @@ -2807,7 +2809,10 @@ static void nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> vmx->nested.nested_vmx_procbased_ctls_low &=
> ~(CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING | CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING);
>
> - /* secondary cpu-based controls */
> + /*
> + * secondary cpu-based controls. Do not include those that
> + * depend on CPUID bits, they are added later by vmx_cpuid_update.
I think vmx_cpuid_update should only clear VMX capability bits, and
not set them. See below.
> + */
> rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2,
> vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_low,
> vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high);
> @@ -2815,7 +2820,6 @@ static void nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high &=
> SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND | SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED |
> SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
> - SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP |
> SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC |
> SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
> SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
> @@ -5269,10 +5273,12 @@ static u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> return exec_control;
> }
>
> -static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> +static void vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> {
> + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &vmx->vcpu;
> +
> u32 exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl;
> - if (!cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(&vmx->vcpu))
> + if (!cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(vcpu))
> exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
> if (vmx->vpid == 0)
> exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID;
> @@ -5286,7 +5292,7 @@ static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
> if (!ple_gap)
> exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING;
> - if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu))
> + if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
> exec_control &= ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
> SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
> exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE;
> @@ -5300,7 +5306,43 @@ static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> if (!enable_pml)
> exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML;
>
> - return exec_control;
> + if (vmx_rdtscp_supported()) {
> + bool rdtscp_enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP);
> + if (!rdtscp_enabled)
> + exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
> +
> + if (nested) {
> + if (rdtscp_enabled)
> + vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high |=
> + SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
CPUID.80000001H:EDX.RDTSCP[bit 27] does not imply
IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2.[bit 35].
> + else
> + vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high &=
> + ~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + if (vmx_invpcid_supported()) {
> + /* Exposing INVPCID only when PCID is exposed */
> + bool invpcid_enabled =
> + guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID) &&
> + guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PCID);
> +
> + if (!invpcid_enabled) {
> + exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
> + guest_cpuid_clear(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID);
> + }
> +
> + if (nested) {
> + if (invpcid_enabled)
> + vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high |=
> + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EBX.INVPCID[bit 10] does not imply
IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2.[bit 44].
> + else
> + vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high &=
> + ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + vmx->secondary_exec_control = exec_control;
> }
>
> static void ept_set_mmio_spte_mask(void)
> @@ -5344,8 +5386,9 @@ static int vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> vmcs_write32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, vmx_exec_control(vmx));
>
> if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) {
> + vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control(vmx);
> vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
> - vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx));
> + vmx->secondary_exec_control);
> }
>
> if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu)) {
> @@ -9623,47 +9666,12 @@ static void nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> static void vmx_cpuid_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
> - u32 secondary_exec_ctl = vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx);
> -
> - if (vmx_rdtscp_supported()) {
> - bool rdtscp_enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP);
> - if (!rdtscp_enabled)
> - secondary_exec_ctl &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
> -
> - if (nested) {
> - if (rdtscp_enabled)
> - vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high |=
> - SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
> - else
> - vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high &=
> - ~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
> - }
> - }
> -
> - if (vmx_invpcid_supported()) {
> - /* Exposing INVPCID only when PCID is exposed */
> - bool invpcid_enabled =
> - guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID) &&
> - guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PCID);
> -
> - if (!invpcid_enabled) {
> - secondary_exec_ctl &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
> - guest_cpuid_clear(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID);
> - }
>
> - if (nested) {
> - if (invpcid_enabled)
> - vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high |=
> - SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
> - else
> - vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high &=
> - ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
> - }
> + if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) {
> + vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control(vmx);
> + vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(vmx->secondary_exec_control);
> }
>
> - if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls())
> - vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(secondary_exec_ctl);
> -
> if (nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
> to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
> FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
> @@ -10356,7 +10364,7 @@ static int prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
> enable_ept ? vmcs12->page_fault_error_code_match : 0);
>
> if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) {
> - exec_control = vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx);
> + exec_control = vmx->secondary_exec_control;
>
> /* Take the following fields only from vmcs12 */
> exec_control &= ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
> --
> 1.8.3.1
>
>
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