[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhSQbR4AN5VZE1cuNBFL=9MqXsOUWwSw3tm93x0qxzHg6Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2017 14:21:16 -0400
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@...sk>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] selinux: check CAP_SETFCAP for a particular inode &
mapped user
On Mon, Oct 9, 2017 at 2:14 PM, Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@...sk> wrote:
> On Thu, 2017-10-05 at 01:48 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>> On Thu, Oct 05, 2017 at 08:16:11AM +0200, Lubomir Rintel wrote:
>> > This allows setting "security.capability" xattr by a user that has
>> > CAP_SETFCAP in an userns with SELinux. Namespaced capabilities are
>> > supported, as of commit 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file
>> > capabilities").
>> >
>> > Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@...sk>
>>
>> The fix is already on its way into the kernel - see the thread at
>> https://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=150713903925728&w=2
>
> Thanks for the response. I'm wondering if there are chances this could
> go to 4.14, given the patch that got merged seems reasonably self-
> contained, quite useful, and the release is going to be a long-term
> one.
>
> If rc5 is too late for such changes, are there changes it could perhaps
> go to a subsequent -stable release?
As a general rule I only send fixes, not new functionality, upwards
during the -rcX releases and this falls into the "functionality" not
"fix" category of patches. I apply a similar approach to -stable
kernels.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
Powered by blists - more mailing lists