linux-kernel - [PATCH] netfilter: ebtables: clean up initialization of buf

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Message-Id: <20171016102402.10358-1-colin.king@canonical.com>
Date:   Mon, 16 Oct 2017 11:24:02 +0100
From:   Colin King <colin.king@...onical.com>
To:     Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>,
        Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@...ckhole.kfki.hu>,
        Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>,
        Stephen Hemminger <stephen@...workplumber.org>,
        "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org, coreteam@...filter.org,
        bridge@...ts.linux-foundation.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     kernel-janitors@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] netfilter: ebtables: clean up initialization of buf

From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@...onical.com>

buf is initialized to buf_start and then set on the next statement
to buf_start + offsets[i].  Clean this up to just initialize buf
to buf_start + offsets[i] to clean up the clang build warning:
"Value stored to 'buf' during its initialization is never read"

Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@...onical.com>
---
 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
index 3b3dcf719e07..37817d25b63d 100644
--- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
+++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
@@ -2112,9 +2112,8 @@ static int size_entry_mwt(struct ebt_entry *entry, const unsigned char *base,
 	for (i = 0, j = 1 ; j < 4 ; j++, i++) {
 		struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *match32;
 		unsigned int size;
-		char *buf = buf_start;
+		char *buf = buf_start + offsets[i];
 
-		buf = buf_start + offsets[i];
 		if (offsets[i] > offsets[j])
 			return -EINVAL;
 
-- 
2.14.1