linux-kernel - Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing

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Message-ID: <20171016204734.GO1845@lvm>
Date:   Mon, 16 Oct 2017 22:47:34 +0200
From:   Christoffer Dall <cdall@...aro.org>
To:     Florent Revest <revestflo@...il.com>
Cc:     Florent Revest <florent.revest@....com>,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, matt@...eblueprint.co.uk,
        ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org, pbonzini@...hat.com, rkrcmar@...hat.com,
        christoffer.dall@...aro.org, catalin.marinas@....com,
        will.deacon@....com, mark.rutland@....com, marc.zyngier@....com,
        linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org, kvmarm@...ts.cs.columbia.edu,
        leif.lindholm@....com
Subject: Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing

On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 11:14:52PM +0200, Florent Revest wrote:
> On Thu, 2017-08-31 at 11:26 +0200, Christoffer Dall wrote:
> > I wonder if this should be split into two series; one that sets up
> > anything you may need from KVM, and another one that uses that for
> > UEFI.
> > 
> > There's a lot KVM and UEFI intertwined logic and assumptions in patch
> > 10, which makes this series a bit hard to read.
> 
> The way hypercalls are currently handled in handle_hvc required this
> mixed patch. Would some kind of HVC subscription mechanism be suitable
> to have in KVM? (e.g: a function allowing to register a callback on a
> certain HVC function ID) This would allow the 10/11 patch to keep the
> kvm code intact.

Yes, I would have no objections to that if it were relatively
non-invasive at runtime for normal VMs.

> 
> > I'd like some documentation (in the series and in
> > Documentation/virtual/kvm) of how this works, and which hidden
> > assumptions there are. For example, how do you ensure you never
> > attempt to return to userspace?
> 
> I don't think my code ensured this. I'd need to give it a second look.
> 
> >  How many VCPUs do you support?
> 
> You can create as many VCPUs as you would in a "normal VM". Also, each
> VCPU can be ran in a kthread.
> 
> >  Do you support any form of virtual interrupts? How about timers?
> 
> No support for virtual interrupts or timers indeed. The EFI Runtime
> Services sandboxing wouldn't require that.
> 
> > Can a VM access physical devices?
> 
> The very idea of Runtime Services sandboxing requires Internal VMs to
> have access to some of the physical devices.
> 
> >  How do you debug and trace something like this? Can the VM be
> > monitored from userspace?
> 
> There is nothing ready for that.
> 
> > These feel like fundamental questions to me that needs addressing
> > before I can competently review the code.
> > 
> > I think a slightly more concrete motivation and outlining the example
> > of the broken UEFI on Seattle would help paving the way for these
> > patches.
> 
> As far as I can remember, EFI Runtime Services on this platform have
> already been reported to sometimes disable or enable interrupts. Maybe
> someone at ARM has more details about the problem ?
> 

Thanks for answering these questions.  If you or anyone else picks up
this work, we can gather some of the stuff in the thread for
documentation and todo items.

Thanks,
-Christoffer