Message-ID: <20171018142517.rhnrehdujfu6mrc7@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Wed, 18 Oct 2017 17:25:17 +0300
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>
Cc:     intel-sgx-kernel-dev@...ts.01.org,
        platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 09/12] intel_sgx: driver documentation

On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 05:51:38PM -0700, Randy Dunlap wrote:
> On 10/16/17 12:18, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
> > ---
> >  Documentation/index.rst         |   1 +
> >  Documentation/x86/intel_sgx.rst | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  2 files changed, 132 insertions(+)
> >  create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/intel_sgx.rst
> > 
> > diff --git a/Documentation/x86/intel_sgx.rst b/Documentation/x86/intel_sgx.rst
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..ee7fe9487d7b
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/Documentation/x86/intel_sgx.rst
> > @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
> > +===================
> > +Intel(R) SGX driver
> > +===================
> > +
> > +Introduction
> > +============
> > +
> > +Intel(R) SGX is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by applications to
> > +set aside private regions of code and data. The code outside the enclave is
> > +disallowed to access the memory inside the enclave by the CPU access control.
> > +In a way you can think that SGX provides inverted sandbox. It protects the
> > +application from a malicious host.
> > +
> > +There is a new hardware unit in the processor called Memory Encryption Engine
> > +(MEE) starting from the Skylake microachitecture. BIOS can define one or many
> 
>                                    microarchitecture.
> 
> > +MEE regions that can hold enclave data by configuring them with PRMRR registers.
> > +
> > +The MEE automatically encrypts the data leaving the processor package to the MEE
> > +regions. The data is encrypted using a random key whose life-time is exactly one
> > +power cycle.
> > +
> > +You can tell if your CPU supports SGX by looking into ``/proc/cpuinfo``:
> > +
> > +	``cat /proc/cpuinfo  | grep ' sgx '``
> 
> Are you sure about a space both before and after 'sgx'?

Only before would make sense.

> 
> > +
> > +Enclave data types
> > +==================
> > +
> > +SGX defines new data types to maintain information about the enclaves and their
> > +security properties.
> > +
> > +The following data structures exist in MEE regions:
> > +
> > +* **Enclave Page Cache (EPC):** memory pages for protected code and data
> > +* **Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM):** meta-data for each EPC page
> > +
> > +The Enclave Page Cache holds following types of pages:
> > +
> > +* **SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS)**: meta-data defining the global
> > +  properties of an enclave such as range of addresses it can access.
> > +* **Regular (REG):** containing code and data for the enclave.
> > +* **Thread Control Structure (TCS):** defines an entry point for a hardware
> > +  thread to enter into the enclave. The enclave can only be entered through
> > +  these entry points.
> > +* **Version Array (VA)**: an EPC page receives a unique 8 byte version number
> > +  when it is swapped, which is then stored into a VA page. A VA page can hold up
> > +  to 512 version numbers.
> > +
> > +Launch control
> > +==============
> > +
> > +For launching an enclave, two structures must be provided for ENCLS(EINIT):
> > +
> > +1. **SIGSTRUCT:** a signed measurement of the enclave binary.
> > +2. **EINITTOKEN:** the measurement, the public key of the signer and various
> > +   enclave attributes. This structure contains a MAC of its contents using
> > +   hardware derived symmetric key called *launch key*.
> > +
> > +The hardware platform contains a root key pair for signing the SIGTRUCT
> > +for a *launch enclave* that is able to acquire the *launch key* for
> > +creating EINITTOKEN's for other enclaves.  For the launch enclave
> > +EINITTOKEN is not needed because it is signed with the private root key.
> > +
> > +There are two feature control bits associate with launch control
> 
>                                       associated            control:

Agreed.

> 
> > +
> > +* **IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL[0]**: locks down the feature control register
> > +* **IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL[17]**: allow runtime reconfiguration of
> > +  IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs that define MRSIGNER hash for the launch
> > +  enclave. Essentially they define a signing key that does not require
> > +  EINITTOKEN to be let run.
> > +
> > +The BIOS can configure IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs before feature control
> > +register is locked.
> > +
> > +It could be tempting to implement launch control by writing the MSRs
> > +every time when an enclave is launched. This does not scale because for
> > +generic case because BIOS might lock down the MSRs before handover to
> > +the OS.
> > +
> > +Debug enclaves
> > +--------------
> > +
> > +Enclave can be set as a *debug enclave* of which memory can be read or written
> > +by using the ENCLS(EDBGRD) and ENCLS(EDBGWR) opcodes. The Intel provided launch
> > +enclave provides them always a valid EINITTOKEN and therefore they are a low
> > +hanging fruit way to try out SGX.
> > +
> > +Virtualization
> > +==============
> > +
> > +Launch control
> > +--------------
> > +
> > +The values for IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs cannot be emulated for a virtual
> > +machine guest. It would easily seem feasible to hold virtual values for these
> > +MSRs, trap ENCLS(EINIT) and use the host LE to generate a token when a guest LE
> > +is initialized.
> > +
> > +However, looking at the pseudo code of ENCLS(EINIT) from the SDM there is a
> > +constraint that the instruction will fail if ATTRIBUTES.EINITTOKENKEY is set
> > +(the documentation does not tell the reason why the constraint exists but it
> > +exists).
> > +
> > +Thus, only when the MSRs are left unlocked before handover to the OS the
> > +setting of these MSRs can be supported for VM guests.
> > +
> > +Suspend and resume
> > +------------------
> > +
> > +If the host suspends and resumes, the enclave memory for the VM guest could
> > +become invalid. This can make ENCLS leaf operations suddenly fail.
> > +
> > +The driver has a graceful fallback mechanism to manage this situation. If any of
> > +the ENCLS leaf operations fail, the driver will fallback by kicking threads out
> > +of the enclave, removing the TCS entries and marking enclave as invalid. After
> > +this no new pages can be allocated for the enclave and no entry can be done.
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> ~Randy

Thank you for the feedback.

/Jarkko

Powered by blists - more mailing lists