[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <alpine.LFD.2.20.1710201614310.20085@t440>
Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2017 16:15:00 +1100 (AEDT)
From: James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>
To: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-audit@...hat.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>,
Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>,
Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH GHAK16 V5 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS
on set*id
On Thu, 19 Oct 2017, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> On 2017-10-11 20:57, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing setuid
> > application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was
> > supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities
> > in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event
> > really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly
> > records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on
> > set*id.
>
> <crickets>
>
> Serge? James? Can one of you two take this via your trees since Paul
> has backed down citing (reasonably) that it is mostly capabilities
> patches rather than audit?
Applied to
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git next-general
--
James Morris
<james.l.morris@...cle.com>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists