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Message-Id: <1509032805.5886.52.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2017 11:46:45 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, joeyli <jlee@...e.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk,
linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, jforbes@...hat.com,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has
been set
[Cc'ing Matthew Garrett]
On Thu, 2017-10-26 at 16:02 +0100, David Howells wrote:
> joeyli <jlee@...e.com> wrote:
>
> > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG) &&
> > + !is_ima_appraise_enabled() &&
> > + kernel_is_locked_down("kexec of unsigned images"))
>
> This doesn't seem right. It seems that you can then kexec unsigned images
> into a locked-down kernel if IMA appraise is enabled.
Huh?! With the "secure_boot" policy enabled on the boot command line,
IMA-appraisal would verify the kexec kernel image, firmware, kernel
modules, and custom IMA policy signatures. With the "ima: require
secure_boot rules in lockdown mode" patch, the "lockdown" mode would
enable IMA-appraisal's secure_boot policy, without requiring the boot
command line option. It would also add the secure_boot rules to the
custom policy, so that if the builtin policy is replaced with a custom
policy, the "secure_boot" policy would still be enforced.
Other patches in this patch series need to be updated as well to check
if IMA-appraisal is enabled.
Mimi
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