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Message-ID: <20171027191412.3gdbbykrvykilwhw@gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 27 Oct 2017 21:14:12 +0200
From:   Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
To:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...radead.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: [GIT PULL] perf fix

Linus,

Please pull the latest perf-urgent-for-linus git tree from:

   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git perf-urgent-for-linus

   # HEAD: 2eece390bf68ec8f733d7e4a3ba8a5ea350082ae perf/x86/intel/bts: Fix exclusive event reference leak

A fix for a misplaced permission check that can leave perf PT or LBR disabled (on 
Intel CPUs) permanently until the next reboot.

 Thanks,

	Ingo

------------------>
Alexander Shishkin (1):
      perf/x86/intel/bts: Fix exclusive event reference leak


 arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
index 16076eb34699..141e07b06216 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
@@ -546,9 +546,6 @@ static int bts_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 	if (event->attr.type != bts_pmu.type)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
-	if (x86_add_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_bts))
-		return -EBUSY;
-
 	/*
 	 * BTS leaks kernel addresses even when CPL0 tracing is
 	 * disabled, so disallow intel_bts driver for unprivileged
@@ -562,6 +559,9 @@ static int bts_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 	    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EACCES;
 
+	if (x86_add_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_bts))
+		return -EBUSY;
+
 	ret = x86_reserve_hardware();
 	if (ret) {
 		x86_del_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_bts);

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