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Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2017 15:13:51 -0400 From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, matthew.garrett@...ula.com, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, jforbes@...hat.com Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down On Thu, 2017-11-02 at 17:22 +0000, David Howells wrote: > #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG > -static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) > +static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags, > + bool can_do_ima_check) > { > int err = -ENOKEY; > const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; > @@ -2781,13 +2783,16 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) > } > > /* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */ > - if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce) > + if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce && > + (!can_do_ima_check || !is_ima_appraise_enabled()) && > + !kernel_is_locked_down("Loading of unsigned modules")) By this point, IMA-appraisal has already verified the kernel module signature back in kernel_read_file_from_fd(), if it was required. Having a key with which to verify the appended signature or requiring an appended signature, should not be required as well. Mimi
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