| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2017 13:47:26 -0800
From: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
To: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@...cle.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <kernellwp@...il.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@...mail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] KVM: nVMX: Fix mmu context after VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME failure
I realize now that there are actually many other problems with
deferring some control field checks to the hardware VM-entry of
vmcs02. When there is an invalid control field, the vCPU should just
fall through to the next instruction, without any state modifiation
other than the ALU flags and the VM-instruction error field of the
current VMCS. However, in preparation for the hardware VM-entry of
vmcs02, we have already changed quite a bit of the vCPU state: the
MSRs on the VM-entry MSR-load list, DR7, IA32_DEBUGCTL, the entire
FLAGS register, etc. All of these changes should be undone, and we're
not prepared to do that. (For instance, what was the old DR7 value
that needs to be restored?)
On Fri, Nov 3, 2017 at 5:07 PM, Krish Sadhukhan
<krish.sadhukhan@...cle.com> wrote:
> On 11/02/2017 05:50 PM, Wanpeng Li wrote:
>
>> From: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@...mail.com>
>>
>> Commit 4f350c6dbcb (kvm: nVMX: Handle deferred early VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME
>> failure
>> properly) can result in L1(run kvm-unit-tests/run_tests.sh vmx_controls in
>> L1)
>> null pointer deference and also L0 calltrace when EPT=0 on both L0 and L1.
>>
>> In L1:
>>
>> BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffc015bf8f
>> IP: vmx_vcpu_run+0x202/0x510 [kvm_intel]
>> PGD 146e13067 P4D 146e13067 PUD 146e15067 PMD 3d2686067 PTE 3d4af9161
>> Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
>> CPU: 2 PID: 1798 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc4+ #6
>> RIP: 0010:vmx_vcpu_run+0x202/0x510 [kvm_intel]
>> Call Trace:
>> WARNING: kernel stack frame pointer at ffffb86f4988bc18 in
>> qemu-system-x86:1798 has bad value 0000000000000002
>>
>> In L0:
>>
>> -----------[ cut here ]------------
>> WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 4460 at /home/kernel/linux/arch/x86/kvm//vmx.c:9845
>> vmx_inject_page_fault_nested+0x130/0x140 [kvm_intel]
>> CPU: 6 PID: 4460 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G OE
>> 4.14.0-rc7+ #25
>> RIP: 0010:vmx_inject_page_fault_nested+0x130/0x140 [kvm_intel]
>> Call Trace:
>> paging64_page_fault+0x500/0xde0 [kvm]
>> ? paging32_gva_to_gpa_nested+0x120/0x120 [kvm]
>> ? nonpaging_page_fault+0x3b0/0x3b0 [kvm]
>> ? __asan_storeN+0x12/0x20
>> ? paging64_gva_to_gpa+0xb0/0x120 [kvm]
>> ? paging64_walk_addr_generic+0x11a0/0x11a0 [kvm]
>> ? lock_acquire+0x2c0/0x2c0
>> ? vmx_read_guest_seg_ar+0x97/0x100 [kvm_intel]
>> ? vmx_get_segment+0x2a6/0x310 [kvm_intel]
>> ? sched_clock+0x1f/0x30
>> ? check_chain_key+0x137/0x1e0
>> ? __lock_acquire+0x83c/0x2420
>> ? kvm_multiple_exception+0xf2/0x220 [kvm]
>> ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x240/0x240
>> ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
>> ? __lock_is_held+0x9e/0x100
>> kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x90/0x180 [kvm]
>> kvm_handle_page_fault+0x15c/0x310 [kvm]
>> ? __lock_is_held+0x9e/0x100
>> handle_exception+0x3c7/0x4d0 [kvm_intel]
>> vmx_handle_exit+0x103/0x1010 [kvm_intel]
>> ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1628/0x2e20 [kvm]
>>
>> The commit avoids to load host state of vmcs12 as vmcs01's guest state
>> since vmcs12 is not modified (except for the VM-instruction error field)
>> if the checking of vmcs control area fails. However, the mmu context is
>> switched to nested mmu in prepare_vmcs02() and it will not be reloaded
>> since load_vmcs12_host_state() is skipped when nested VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME
>> fails. This patch fixes it by reloading mmu context when nested
>> VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME fails.
>>
>> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
>> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
>> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@...mail.com>
>> ---
>> v3 -> v4:
>> * move it to a new function load_vmcs12_mmu_host_state
>>
>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------
>> 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>> index 6cf3972..8aefb91 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>> @@ -11259,6 +11259,24 @@ static void prepare_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
>> kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
>> }
>> +static void load_vmcs12_mmu_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> + struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>> +{
>> + u32 entry_failure_code;
>> +
>> + nested_ept_uninit_mmu_context(vcpu);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Only PDPTE load can fail as the value of cr3 was checked on
>> entry and
>> + * couldn't have changed.
>> + */
>> + if (nested_vmx_load_cr3(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr3, false,
>> &entry_failure_code))
>> + nested_vmx_abort(vcpu, VMX_ABORT_LOAD_HOST_PDPTE_FAIL);
>> +
>> + if (!enable_ept)
>> + vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->inject_page_fault =
>> kvm_inject_page_fault;
>> +}
>> +
>> /*
>> * A part of what we need to when the nested L2 guest exits and we want
>> to
>> * run its L1 parent, is to reset L1's guest state to the host state
>> specified
>> @@ -11272,7 +11290,6 @@ static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu
>> *vcpu,
>> struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>> {
>> struct kvm_segment seg;
>> - u32 entry_failure_code;
>> if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER)
>> vcpu->arch.efer = vmcs12->host_ia32_efer;
>> @@ -11299,17 +11316,7 @@ static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct
>> kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits =
>> ~vmcs_readl(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK);
>> vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr4);
>> - nested_ept_uninit_mmu_context(vcpu);
>> -
>> - /*
>> - * Only PDPTE load can fail as the value of cr3 was checked on
>> entry and
>> - * couldn't have changed.
>> - */
>> - if (nested_vmx_load_cr3(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr3, false,
>> &entry_failure_code))
>> - nested_vmx_abort(vcpu, VMX_ABORT_LOAD_HOST_PDPTE_FAIL);
>> -
>> - if (!enable_ept)
>> - vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->inject_page_fault =
>> kvm_inject_page_fault;
>> + load_vmcs12_mmu_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12);
>> if (enable_vpid) {
>> /*
>> @@ -11539,6 +11546,9 @@ static void nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu
>> *vcpu, u32 exit_reason,
>> * accordingly.
>> */
>> nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD);
>> +
>> + load_vmcs12_mmu_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12);
>> +
>> /*
>> * The emulated instruction was already skipped in
>> * nested_vmx_run, but the updated RIP was never
>
> Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@...cle.com>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists