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Message-ID: <20171108200916.GF22894@wotan.suse.de>
Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2017 21:09:16 +0100
From: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@...nel.org>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk,
linux-efi <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>,
Marcus Meissner <meissner@...e.de>,
"AKASHI, Takahiro" <takahiro.akashi@...aro.org>
Subject: Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel
lockdown
On Wed, Nov 08, 2017 at 03:01:09PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>
> > > Or reflect that IMA-appraisal, if enabled, will enforce firmware being
> > > validly signed.
> >
> > But FWICT lockdown is a built-in kernel thingy, unless lockdown implies IMA
> > it would not be the place to refer to it.
> >
> > It seems the documentation was proposed to help users if an error was caught.
> > That error should cover only what is being addressed in code on the kernel.
>
> Enabling "lockdown" needs to take into account IMA-appraisal to
> prevent breaking systems with it enabled.
>
> An IMA builtin "secure_boot" policy was already upstreamed (commit
> 503ceaef8e2e "ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file
> signatures"). An additional patch, automatically enables the
> "secure_boot" policy in "lockdown" mode.
>
> Refer to this discussion and patch:
> http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2017-October/003913.html
> http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2017-October/003910.html
Ah then yeah this makes sense to mesh into the lock down documentation.
Luis
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