linux-kernel - Re: leaking_addresses script..

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Date:   Thu, 16 Nov 2017 12:59:54 +1100
From:   "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>
To:     Konstantin Ryabitsev <konstantin@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: leaking_addresses script..

On Wed, Nov 15, 2017 at 04:31:56PM -0500, Konstantin Ryabitsev wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 16, 2017 at 08:11:24AM +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> >On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 02:45:59PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> >>On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 1:03 PM, Tobin C. Harding <me@...in.cc> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> I did not sign the tag, it looks like you have not processed this yet.
> >>> Do you want me to re-do the pull request on a signed tag?
> >>
> >>When pulling from github? Absolutely.
> >
> >Linus I'm not in the web of trust, pulling a tag signed by an _unknown_
> >key is not secure is it? Would it not be better to get into the web of
> >trust first before requesting you pull any code from me.
> 
> Many kernel developers use "Trust on First Use" (TOFU) approach, which is
> not unreasonable -- it's what ssh has been using for the past couple of
> decades. In the end, the goal of tag signing is not to verify your
> *identity* but to verify that Tobin C. Harding from today is the same Tobin
> C.  Harding whose code was reviewed and merged 3 months ago.

Cool.

> >Also, once I get in the web of trust I can apply to get my tree hosted
> >on git.kernel.org so you don't have to pull from GitHub.
> 
> We have different rules for issuing actual accounts at kernel.org. We *do*
> rely on the web of trust, since I personally have no way of verifying who is
> a real developer and who isn't. Even then, I don't really care about your
> identity as much as I need to have assurances from other members of
> kernel.org that they have worked with you previously and they can vouch that
> you are their fellow kernel developer.

I'll sort it out and get back to you.

thanks,
Tobin.