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Message-ID: <CAErMHp_FjUubPABASuHQNQ3LFR=P4O4YOTTrNUcL3B6_UdHurA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2017 18:17:15 +0900
From: Jinbum Park <jinb.park7@...il.com>
To: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Afzal Mohammed <afzal.mohd.ma@...il.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, linux@...linux.org.uk,
gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
vladimir.murzin@....com, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening][PATCH v3 3/3] arm: mm: dump: add checking for
writable and executable pages
2017-12-06 8:51 GMT+09:00 Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>:
> On 12/04/2017 06:27 AM, Jinbum Park wrote:
>>
>> Page mappings with full RWX permissions are a security risk.
>> x86, arm64 has an option to walk the page tables
>> and dump any bad pages.
>>
>> (1404d6f13e47
>> ("arm64: dump: Add checking for writable and exectuable pages"))
>> Add a similar implementation for arm.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Jinbum Park <jinb.park7@...il.com>
>> ---
>> v3: Reuse pg_level, prot_bits to check ro, nx prot.
>>
>> arch/arm/Kconfig.debug | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++
>> arch/arm/include/asm/ptdump.h | 8 +++++++
>> arch/arm/mm/dump.c | 51
>> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> arch/arm/mm/init.c | 2 ++
>> 4 files changed, 88 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug b/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
>> index e7b94db..78a6470 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
>> +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
>> @@ -20,6 +20,33 @@ config ARM_PTDUMP_DEBUGFS
>> kernel.
>> If in doubt, say "N"
>> +config DEBUG_WX
>> + bool "Warn on W+X mappings at boot"
>> + select ARM_PTDUMP_CORE
>> + ---help---
>> + Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot.
>> +
>> + This is useful for discovering cases where the kernel is
>> leaving
>> + W+X mappings after applying NX, as such mappings are a
>> security risk.
>> +
>> + Look for a message in dmesg output like this:
>> +
>> + arm/mm: Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages
>> found.
>> +
>> + or like this, if the check failed:
>> +
>> + arm/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, <N> W+X
>> pages found.
>> +
>> + Note that even if the check fails, your kernel is possibly
>> + still fine, as W+X mappings are not a security hole in
>> + themselves, what they do is that they make the
>> exploitation
>> + of other unfixed kernel bugs easier.
>> +
>> + There is no runtime or memory usage effect of this option
>> + once the kernel has booted up - it's a one time check.
>> +
>> + If in doubt, say "Y".
>> +
>> # RMK wants arm kernels compiled with frame pointers or stack unwinding.
>> # If you know what you are doing and are willing to live without stack
>> # traces, you can get a slightly smaller kernel by setting this option
>> to
>> diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/ptdump.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/ptdump.h
>> index 3a6c0b7..b6a0162 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/ptdump.h
>> +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/ptdump.h
>> @@ -43,6 +43,14 @@ static inline int ptdump_debugfs_register(struct
>> ptdump_info *info,
>> }
>> #endif /* CONFIG_ARM_PTDUMP_DEBUGFS */
>> +void ptdump_check_wx(void);
>> +
>> #endif /* CONFIG_ARM_PTDUMP_CORE */
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_WX
>> +#define debug_checkwx() ptdump_check_wx()
>> +#else
>> +#define debug_checkwx() do { } while (0)
>> +#endif
>> +
>> #endif /* __ASM_PTDUMP_H */
>> diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/dump.c b/arch/arm/mm/dump.c
>> index 43a2bee..3e2e6f0 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm/mm/dump.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm/mm/dump.c
>> @@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ struct pg_state {
>> unsigned long start_address;
>> unsigned level;
>> u64 current_prot;
>> + bool check_wx;
>> + unsigned long wx_pages;
>> const char *current_domain;
>> };
>> @@ -194,6 +196,8 @@ struct pg_level {
>> const struct prot_bits *bits;
>> size_t num;
>> u64 mask;
>> + const struct prot_bits *ro_bit;
>> + const struct prot_bits *nx_bit;
>> };
It looks better~:)
I'll prepare new version.
>> static struct pg_level pg_level[] = {
>> @@ -203,9 +207,17 @@ struct pg_level {
>> }, { /* pmd */
>> .bits = section_bits,
>> .num = ARRAY_SIZE(section_bits),
>> + #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_LPAE
>> + .ro_bit = section_bits + 1,
>> + #else
>> + .ro_bit = section_bits,
>> + #endif
>> + .nx_bit = section_bits + ARRAY_SIZE(section_bits) - 2,
>> }, { /* pte */
>> .bits = pte_bits,
>> .num = ARRAY_SIZE(pte_bits),
>> + .ro_bit = pte_bits + 1,
>> + .nx_bit = pte_bits + 2,
>> },
>> };
>>
>
>
> This is better but the addition offset from the array is still
> prone to breakage if we add entries. Maybe something like this
> on top of yours:
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/dump.c b/arch/arm/mm/dump.c
> index 3e2e6f06e4d9..572cbc4dc247 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/mm/dump.c
> +++ b/arch/arm/mm/dump.c
> @@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ struct prot_bits {
> u64 val;
> const char *set;
> const char *clear;
> + bool ro_bit;
> + bool x_bit;
> };
> static const struct prot_bits pte_bits[] = {
> @@ -75,11 +77,13 @@ static const struct prot_bits pte_bits[] = {
> .val = L_PTE_RDONLY,
> .set = "ro",
> .clear = "RW",
> + .ro_bit = true,
> }, {
> .mask = L_PTE_XN,
> .val = L_PTE_XN,
> .set = "NX",
> .clear = "x ",
> + .x_bit = true,
> }, {
> .mask = L_PTE_SHARED,
> .val = L_PTE_SHARED,
> @@ -143,11 +147,13 @@ static const struct prot_bits section_bits[] = {
> .val = L_PMD_SECT_RDONLY | PMD_SECT_AP2,
> .set = "ro",
> .clear = "RW",
> + .ro_bit = true,
> #elif __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ >= 6
> {
> .mask = PMD_SECT_APX | PMD_SECT_AP_READ |
> PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE,
> .val = PMD_SECT_APX | PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE,
> .set = " ro",
> + .ro_bit = true,
> }, {
> .mask = PMD_SECT_APX | PMD_SECT_AP_READ |
> PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE,
> .val = PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE,
> @@ -166,6 +172,7 @@ static const struct prot_bits section_bits[] = {
> .mask = PMD_SECT_AP_READ | PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE,
> .val = 0,
> .set = " ro",
> + .ro_bit = true,
> }, {
> .mask = PMD_SECT_AP_READ | PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE,
> .val = PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE,
> @@ -184,6 +191,7 @@ static const struct prot_bits section_bits[] = {
> .val = PMD_SECT_XN,
> .set = "NX",
> .clear = "x ",
> + .x_bit = true,
> }, {
> .mask = PMD_SECT_S,
> .val = PMD_SECT_S,
> @@ -207,17 +215,9 @@ static struct pg_level pg_level[] = {
> }, { /* pmd */
> .bits = section_bits,
> .num = ARRAY_SIZE(section_bits),
> - #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_LPAE
> - .ro_bit = section_bits + 1,
> - #else
> - .ro_bit = section_bits,
> - #endif
> - .nx_bit = section_bits + ARRAY_SIZE(section_bits) - 2,
> }, { /* pte */
> .bits = pte_bits,
> .num = ARRAY_SIZE(pte_bits),
> - .ro_bit = pte_bits + 1,
> - .nx_bit = pte_bits + 2,
> },
> };
> @@ -410,8 +410,13 @@ static void ptdump_initialize(void)
> for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pg_level); i++)
> if (pg_level[i].bits)
> - for (j = 0; j < pg_level[i].num; j++)
> + for (j = 0; j < pg_level[i].num; j++) {
> pg_level[i].mask |=
> pg_level[i].bits[j].mask;
> + if (pg_level[i].bits[j].ro_bit)
> + pg_level[i].ro_bit =
> &pg_level[i].bits[j];
> + if (pg_level[i].bits[j].x_bit)
> + pg_level[i].nx_bit =
> &pg_level[i].bits[j];
> + }
> address_markers[2].start_address = VMALLOC_START;
> }
>
>
>
>
>>
>> @@ -226,6 +238,23 @@ static void dump_prot(struct pg_state *st, const
>> struct prot_bits *bits, size_t
>> }
>> }
>> +static void note_prot_wx(struct pg_state *st, unsigned long addr)
>> +{
>> + if (!st->check_wx)
>> + return;
>> + if ((st->current_prot & pg_level[st->level].ro_bit->mask) ==
>> + pg_level[st->level].ro_bit->val)
>> + return;
>> + if ((st->current_prot & pg_level[st->level].nx_bit->mask) ==
>> + pg_level[st->level].nx_bit->val)
>> + return;
>> +
>> + WARN_ONCE(1, "arm/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address
>> %p/%pS\n",
>> + (void *)st->start_address, (void *)st->start_address);
>> +
>
>
> With the new %p hashing, printing just %p is not useful, so just drop
> it and just have the %pS.
ok, I'll drop the %p.
>
> Thanks,
> Laura
>
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