linux-kernel - Re: [patch 05/16] mm: Allow special mappings with user access cleared

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Message-ID: <b303fac7-34af-5065-f996-4494fb8c09a2@intel.com>
Date:   Wed, 13 Dec 2017 07:14:41 -0800
From:   Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To:     "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@...e.de>,
        Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>,
        Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
        Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@...hat.com>,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
        David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>,
        Eduardo Valentin <eduval@...zon.com>, aliguori@...zon.com,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
        "linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com, aneesh.kumar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [patch 05/16] mm: Allow special mappings with user access cleared

On 12/13/2017 04:57 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> Dave, what is effect of this on protection keys?

The goal was to make pkeys-protected userspace memory access
_consistent_ with normal access.  Specifically, we want a kernel to
disallow access (or writes) to memory where userspace mapping has a pkey
whose permissions are in conflict with the access.

For instance:

This will fault writing a byte to 'addr':

	char *addr = malloc(PAGE_SIZE);
	pkey_mprotect(addr, PAGE_SIZE, 13);
	pkey_deny_access(13);
	*addr[0] = 'f';

But this will write one byte to addr successfully (if it uses the kernel
mapping of the physical page backing 'addr'):

	char *addr = malloc(PAGE_SIZE);
	pkey_mprotect(addr, PAGE_SIZE, 13);
	pkey_deny_access(13);
	read(fd, addr, 1);