linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] exec: Weaken dumpability for secureexec

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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJfqWJG=kk+dkd+p2Tb0AvX2Cve0cCFjC+xYraZZQTzQw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Wed, 3 Jan 2018 09:21:16 -0800
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Tom Horsley <horsley1953@...il.com>,
        Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] exec: Weaken dumpability for secureexec

On Tue, Jan 2, 2018 at 11:06 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 02, 2018 at 03:21:33PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
>> This is a logical revert of:
>>
>>     commit e37fdb785a5f ("exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability")
>>
>> This weakens dumpability back to checking only for uid/gid changes in
>> current (which is useless), but userspace depends on dumpability not
>> being tied to secureexec.
>>
>> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1528633
>>
>> Reported-by: Tom Horsley <horsley1953@...il.com>
>> Fixes: e37fdb785a5f ("exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability")
>> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>> ---
>>  fs/exec.c | 9 +++++++--
>>  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
>> index 5688b5e1b937..7eb8d21bcab9 100644
>> --- a/fs/exec.c
>> +++ b/fs/exec.c
>> @@ -1349,9 +1349,14 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
>>
>>       current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0;
>>
>> -     /* Figure out dumpability. */
>> +     /*
>> +      * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current
>> +      * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing
>> +      * bprm->secureexec instead.
>> +      */
>>       if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
>> -         bprm->secureexec)
>> +         !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
>> +           gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
>
> So what about the pdeath_signal?  Is that going to be another subtle
> time-bomb?

pdeath_signal used another wrong method to set itself, but it was
better than dumpable. I'd rather we leave it as-is, since I'd like to
have everything controlled by secureexec.

The more interesting thing here is that secureexec is set for a
process that ISN'T actually setuid. (ptrace of a setuid process). I
think tha'ts the real bug, but not something I'm going to be able to
fix quickly. So, for now, I want to revert this, then try to fix the
weird case, and see if that breaks anyone, then fix this back to
secureexec.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security