linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH] asm/generic: introduce if_nospec and nospec

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Message-ID: <20180104233259.GA24680@amd>
Date:   Fri, 5 Jan 2018 00:33:00 +0100
From:   Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To:     Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Cc:     Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@...6.fr>,
        Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
        Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>,
        Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] asm/generic: introduce if_nospec and nospec_barrier

Hi!

> > What did it leak? Nothing. Attacker had to know
> > array+attacker_controlled_index, and he now knows
> > (array+attacker_controlled_index)%CACHELINE_SIZE.
> >
> > With (void) array2[val];, the attack gets interesting -- I now know
> > *(array+attacker_controlled_index) % CACHELINE_SIZE ... allowing me to
> > get information from arbitrary place in memory -- which is useful for
> > .. reading ssh keys, for example.
> 
> Right, but how far away from "val = array[attacker_controlled_index];"
> in the instruction stream do you need to look before you're
> comfortable there's no 'val' dependent reads in the speculation window
> on all possible architectures. Until we have variable annotations and
> compiler help my guess is that static analysis has an easier time
> pointing us to the first potentially bad speculative access.

Well, you are already scanning for if (attacker_controlled_index <
limit) .... array[attacker_controlled_index] and those can already be
far away from each other....

Anyway, likely in the end human should be creating the patch, and if
there's no array2[val], we do not need the patch after all.

Best regards,

									Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

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