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Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1801040127150.1957@nanos>
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 01:29:58 +0100 (CET)
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
To: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>
cc: tglx@...uxtronix.de, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
gregkh@...ux-foundation.org, dwmw@...zon.co.uk,
tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
dave.hansen@...el.com, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/11] retpoline/taint: Taint kernel for missing retpoline
in compiler
On Wed, 3 Jan 2018, Andi Kleen wrote:
> unwind_init();
> +
> +#ifndef RETPOLINE
> + add_taint(TAINT_NO_RETPOLINE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
> + pr_warn("No support for retpoline in kernel compiler\n");
> + pr_warn("Kernel may be vulnerable to data leaks.\n");
That's blantantly wrong.
The kernel is not vulnerable to data leaks. The hardware is.
An that's what the CPU_BUG bit is for. If the mitigation is in place,
activate the proper feature bit like we did with PTI
Thanks,
tglx
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