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Message-ID: <f59431c9-cae1-8794-4b42-49de3dd7257d@linux.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 12:58:23 -0800
From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/7] x86/spec_ctrl: Add sysctl knobs to enable/disable
SPEC_CTRL feature
On 01/04/2018 12:16 PM, Greg KH wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:47AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
>> There are 2 ways to control IBRS
>>
>> 1. At boot time
>> noibrs kernel boot parameter will disable IBRS usage
>>
>> Otherwise if the above parameters are not specified, the system
>> will enable ibrs and ibpb usage if the cpu supports it.
>>
>> 2. At run time
>> echo 0 > /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled will turn off IBRS
>> echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled will turn on IBRS in kernel
>> echo 2 > /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled will turn on IBRS in both userspace and kernel
>>
>> The implementation was updated with input from Andrea Arcangeli.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
>> ---
>> Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 +
>> arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h | 163 +++++++++++++++++++-----
>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile | 1 +
>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 10 ++
>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c | 124 ++++++++++++++++++
>> 5 files changed, 270 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
>> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
>> index 5dfd262..d64f49f 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
>> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
>> @@ -2573,6 +2573,10 @@
>> noexec=on: enable non-executable mappings (default)
>> noexec=off: disable non-executable mappings
>>
>> + noibrs [X86]
>> + Don't use indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS)
>> + feature.
>> +
>> nosmap [X86]
>> Disable SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention)
>> even if it is supported by processor.
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
>> index 23b2804..2c35571 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
>> @@ -1,13 +1,17 @@
>> #ifndef _ASM_X86_SPEC_CTRL_H
>> #define _ASM_X86_SPEC_CTRL_H
>>
>> -#include <linux/stringify.h>
>> #include <asm/msr-index.h>
>> #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
>> -#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
>> +
>> +#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_INUSE (1<<0) /* OS enables IBRS usage */
>> +#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_SUPPORTED (1<<1) /* System supports IBRS */
>> +#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_ADMIN_DISABLED (1<<2) /* Admin disables IBRS */
>>
>> #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
>>
>> +.extern spec_ctrl_ibrs
>> +
>> .macro PUSH_MSR_REGS
>> pushq %rax
>> pushq %rcx
>> @@ -27,35 +31,63 @@
>> .endm
>>
>> .macro ENABLE_IBRS
>> - ALTERNATIVE "jmp 10f", "", X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL
>> + testl $SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_INUSE, spec_ctrl_ibrs
>> + jz .Lskip_\@
>> +
>> PUSH_MSR_REGS
>> WRMSR_ASM $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, $SPEC_CTRL_FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS
>> POP_MSR_REGS
>> -10:
>> +
>> + jmp .Ldone_\@
>> +.Lskip_\@:
>> + /*
>> + * prevent speculation beyond here as we could want to
>> + * stop speculation by enabling IBRS
>> + */
>> + lfence
>> +.Ldone_\@:
>> .endm
>>
>> .macro DISABLE_IBRS
>> - ALTERNATIVE "jmp 10f", "", X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL
>> + testl $SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_INUSE, spec_ctrl_ibrs
>> + jz .Lskip_\@
>> +
>> PUSH_MSR_REGS
>> WRMSR_ASM $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, $SPEC_CTRL_FEATURE_DISABLE_IBRS
>> POP_MSR_REGS
>> -10:
>> +
>> +.Lskip_\@:
>> .endm
>>
>> .macro ENABLE_IBRS_CLOBBER
>> - ALTERNATIVE "jmp 10f", "", X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL
>> + testl $SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_INUSE, spec_ctrl_ibrs
>> + jz .Lskip_\@
>> +
>> WRMSR_ASM $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, $SPEC_CTRL_FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS
>> -10:
>> +
>> + jmp .Ldone_\@
>> +.Lskip_\@:
>> + /*
>> + * prevent speculation beyond here as we could want to
>> + * stop speculation by enabling IBRS
>> + */
>> + lfence
>> +.Ldone_\@:
>> .endm
>>
>> .macro DISABLE_IBRS_CLOBBER
>> - ALTERNATIVE "jmp 10f", "", X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL
>> + testl $SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_INUSE, spec_ctrl_ibrs
>> + jz .Lskip_\@
>> +
>> WRMSR_ASM $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, $SPEC_CTRL_FEATURE_DISABLE_IBRS
>> -10:
>> +
>> +.Lskip_\@:
>> .endm
>>
>> .macro ENABLE_IBRS_SAVE_AND_CLOBBER save_reg:req
>> - ALTERNATIVE "jmp 10f", "", X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL
>> + testl $SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_INUSE, spec_ctrl_ibrs
>> + jz .Lskip_\@
>> +
>> movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
>> rdmsr
>> movl %eax, \save_reg
>> @@ -63,22 +95,103 @@
>> movl $0, %edx
>> movl $SPEC_CTRL_FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS, %eax
>> wrmsr
>> -10:
>> +
>> + jmp .Ldone_\@
>> +.Lskip_\@:
>> + /*
>> + * prevent speculation beyond here as we could want to
>> + * stop speculation by enabling IBRS
>> + */
>> + lfence
>> +.Ldone_\@:
>> .endm
>>
>> .macro RESTORE_IBRS_CLOBBER save_reg:req
>> - ALTERNATIVE "jmp 10f", "", X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL
>> + testl $SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_INUSE, spec_ctrl_ibrs
>> + jz .Lskip_\@
>> +
>> /* Set IBRS to the value saved in the save_reg */
>> movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
>> movl $0, %edx
>> movl \save_reg, %eax
>> wrmsr
>> -10:
>> +
>> + jmp .Ldone_\@
>> +.Lskip_\@:
>> + /*
>> + * prevent speculation beyond here as we could want to
>> + * stop speculation by enabling IBRS
>> + */
>> + lfence
>> +.Ldone_\@:
>> .endm
>>
>> #else
>> #include <asm/microcode.h>
>>
>> +extern int spec_ctrl_ibrs;
>> +extern struct mutex spec_ctrl_mutex;
>> +extern unsigned int ibrs_enabled;
>> +
>> +enum {
>> + IBRS_DISABLED,
>> + /* in host kernel, disabled in guest and userland */
>> + IBRS_ENABLED,
>> + /* in host kernel and host userland, disabled in guest */
>> + IBRS_ENABLED_USER,
>> + IBRS_MAX = IBRS_ENABLED_USER,
>
> Yup, not a bit field, your documentation is wrong :(
>
>> +};
>> +
>> +
>> +static inline void set_ibrs_inuse(void)
>> +{
>> + if (spec_ctrl_ibrs & SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_SUPPORTED)
>> + spec_ctrl_ibrs |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_INUSE;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline void clear_ibrs_inuse(void)
>> +{
>> + spec_ctrl_ibrs &= ~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_INUSE;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline int ibrs_inuse(void)
>> +{
>> + if (spec_ctrl_ibrs & SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_INUSE)
>> + return 1;
>> + else
>> + /*
>> + * prevent speculation beyond here as we could want to
>> + * stop speculation by enabling IBRS with this check
>> + */
>> + rmb();
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline void set_ibrs_supported(void)
>> +{
>> + spec_ctrl_ibrs |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_SUPPORTED;
>> + if (!(spec_ctrl_ibrs & SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_ADMIN_DISABLED))
>> + set_ibrs_inuse();
>> + else
>> + /*
>> + * prevent speculation beyond here as we could want to
>> + * stop speculation by enabling IBRS
>> + */
>> + rmb();
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline void set_ibrs_disabled(void)
>> +{
>> + spec_ctrl_ibrs |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_ADMIN_DISABLED;
>> + if (ibrs_inuse())
>> + clear_ibrs_inuse();
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline void clear_ibrs_disabled(void)
>> +{
>> + spec_ctrl_ibrs &= ~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_ADMIN_DISABLED;
>> +}
>> +
>> static inline void __disable_indirect_speculation(void)
>> {
>> native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS);
>> @@ -96,21 +209,14 @@ static inline void __enable_indirect_speculation(void)
>> static inline void unprotected_speculation_begin(void)
>> {
>> WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled());
>> - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
>> + if (ibrs_inuse())
>> __enable_indirect_speculation();
>> }
>>
>> static inline void unprotected_speculation_end(void)
>> {
>> - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
>> + if (ibrs_inuse())
>> __disable_indirect_speculation();
>> - else
>> - /*
>> - * If we intended to disable indirect speculation
>> - * but come here due to mis-speculation, we need
>> - * to stop the mis-speculation with rmb.
>> - */
>> - rmb();
>> }
>>
>>
>> @@ -121,20 +227,13 @@ static inline void unprotected_speculation_end(void)
>> */
>> static inline void unprotected_firmware_begin(void)
>> {
>> - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
>> + if (ibrs_inuse())
>> __disable_indirect_speculation();
>> - else
>> - /*
>> - * If we intended to disable indirect speculation
>> - * but come here due to mis-speculation, we need
>> - * to stop the mis-speculation with rmb.
>> - */
>> - rmb();
>> }
>>
>> static inline void unprotected_firmware_end(void)
>> {
>> - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
>> + if (ibrs_inuse())
>> __enable_indirect_speculation();
>> }
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
>> index 90cb82d..a25f1ab 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
>> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ obj-y += match.o
>> obj-y += bugs.o
>> obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_FREQ) += aperfmperf.o
>> obj-y += cpuid-deps.o
>> +obj-y += spec_ctrl.o
>>
>> obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
>> obj-$(CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES) += capflags.o powerflags.o
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
>> index bc50c40..2d23a2fe 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
>> @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
>> #include <asm/processor.h>
>>
>> #include <asm/apic.h>
>> +#include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
>>
>> struct cpuid_bit {
>> u16 feature;
>> @@ -56,6 +57,15 @@ void init_scattered_cpuid_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>>
>> if (regs[cb->reg] & (1 << cb->bit))
>> set_cpu_cap(c, cb->feature);
>> +
>> + }
>> + if (!c->cpu_index) {
>> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) {
>> + printk(KERN_INFO "FEATURE SPEC_CTRL Present\n");
>> + set_ibrs_supported();
>> + if (ibrs_inuse())
>> + ibrs_enabled = IBRS_ENABLED;
>> + }
>> }
>> }
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..6946678
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
>> +#include <linux/export.h>
>
> No copyright or SPDX line?
>
> At least it doesn't have the old horrid Intel header boilerplate, so I
> should be thankful of that. But it isn't ok like this either, sorry.
>
>> +#include <linux/init.h>
>> +#include <linux/mutex.h>
>> +#include <linux/debugfs.h>
>> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
>> +
>> +#include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
>> +#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * spec_ctrl_ibrs
>> + * bit 0 = indicate if ibrs is currently in use
>> + * bit 1 = indicate if system supports ibrs
>> + * bit 2 = indicate if admin disables ibrs
>
> Why bits and not integer values? Can you mix them?
spec_ctrl_ibrs has bit fields for internal speculation
control and is not exposed to user.
ibrs_enabled is reported to the user and takes the enum
values
+enum {
+ IBRS_DISABLED,
+ /* in host kernel, disabled in guest and userland */
+ IBRS_ENABLED,
+ /* in host kernel and host userland, disabled in guest */
+ IBRS_ENABLED_USER,
+ IBRS_MAX = IBRS_ENABLED_USER,
+};
+
>
>> + */
>> +
>> +int spec_ctrl_ibrs;
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(spec_ctrl_ibrs);
>
> Why is this exported? What module will ever need this?
>
> And horrid global symbol name, it doesn't say what it is in an obvious
> way just by looking at it.
>
>> +
>> +/* mutex to serialize IBRS control changes */
>> +DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(spec_ctrl_mutex);
>
> Why export this? You only ever use it in one place? Again, what module
> needs it?
It is needed for places that potentially have more than one cpu
touching spec_ctrl_ibrs values. I'll see if I can consolidate
them to spec_ctrl.c to avoid the export.
>
> And I have to ask, EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() for this and spec_ctrl_ibrs as
> well?
>
>> +unsigned int ibrs_enabled __read_mostly;
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ibrs_enabled);
>
> Again, what module needs this?
>
> And did __read_mostly really matter in performance tests?
>
>> +
>> +static int __init noibrs(char *str)
>> +{
>> + set_ibrs_disabled();
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +early_param("noibrs", ex);
>> +
>> +static ssize_t __enabled_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
>> + size_t count, loff_t *ppos, unsigned int *field)
>> +{
>> + char buf[32];
>> + unsigned int len;
>> +
>> + len = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", READ_ONCE(*field));
>> + return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, len);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static ssize_t ibrs_enabled_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
>> + size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
>> +{
>> + return __enabled_read(file, user_buf, count, ppos, &ibrs_enabled);
>> +}
>
> It's a single variable, why such complex debugfs for that? This should
> be handled by a helper macro already, right?
>
>> +static void spec_ctrl_flush_all_cpus(u32 msr_nr, u64 val)
>> +{
>> + int cpu;
>> + get_online_cpus();
>> + for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
>> + wrmsrl_on_cpu(cpu, msr_nr, val);
>> + put_online_cpus();
>> +}
>> +
>> +static ssize_t ibrs_enabled_write(struct file *file,
>> + const char __user *user_buf,
>> + size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
>> +{
>> + char buf[32];
>> + ssize_t len;
>> + unsigned int enable;
>> +
>> + len = min(count, sizeof(buf) - 1);
>> + if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, len))
>> + return -EFAULT;
>> +
>> + buf[len] = '\0';
>> + if (kstrtouint(buf, 0, &enable))
>> + return -EINVAL;
>
> 3 value "flags" are horrid :(
Unfortunately, IBRS can have 3 different usage scenarios:
1. disabled all the time
2. used only in kernel and privileged code
3. enabled all the time in both user and kernel space.
>
>> +
>> + if (enable > IBRS_MAX)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
>
> Always run checkpatch.pl so you don't get grumpy kernel maintainers
> telling you to run checkpatch.pl :(
>
>> +
>> + if (enable == IBRS_DISABLED) {
>> + /* disable IBRS usage */
>> + set_ibrs_disabled();
>> + if (spec_ctrl_ibrs & SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_SUPPORTED)
>> + spec_ctrl_flush_all_cpus(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_FEATURE_DISABLE_IBRS);
>> + } else if (enable == IBRS_ENABLED) {
>> + /* enable IBRS usage in kernel */
>> + clear_ibrs_disabled();
>> + if (spec_ctrl_ibrs & SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_SUPPORTED)
>> + set_ibrs_inuse();
>> + else
>> + /* Platform don't support IBRS */
>> + enable = IBRS_DISABLED;
>> + } else if (enable == IBRS_ENABLED_USER) {
>> + /* enable IBRS usage in both userspace and kernel */
>> + clear_ibrs_disabled();
>> + /* don't change IBRS value once we set it to always on */
>> + clear_ibrs_inuse();
>> + if (spec_ctrl_ibrs & SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_SUPPORTED)
>> + spec_ctrl_flush_all_cpus(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS);
>> + else
>> + /* Platform don't support IBRS */
>> + enable = IBRS_DISABLED;
>> + }
>> +
>> + WRITE_ONCE(ibrs_enabled, enable);
>
> It's a debugfs write callback, why do you care about WRITE_ONCE()?
Probably not necessary now. It is serialized by spec_ctrl_mutex.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
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