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Message-Id: <20180105145750.53294-5-mark.rutland@arm.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 14:57:50 +0000
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org
Cc: dan.j.williams@...el.com, elena.reshetova@...el.com,
corbet@....net, alan@...ux.intel.com, peterz@...radead.org,
will.deacon@....com, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org,
tglx@...utronix.de, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Subject: [RFCv2 4/4] bpf: inhibit speculated out-of-bounds pointers
Note: this patch is an *example* use of the nospec API. It is understood
that this is incomplete, etc.
Under speculation, CPUs may mis-predict branches in bounds checks. Thus,
memory accesses under a bounds check may be speculated even if the
bounds check fails, providing a primitive for building a side channel.
The EBPF map code has a number of such bounds-checks accesses in
map_lookup_elem implementations. This patch modifies these to use the
nospec helpers to inhibit such side channels.
The JITted lookup_elem implementations remain potentially vulnerable,
and are disabled (with JITted code falling back to the C
implementations).
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
---
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 20 +++++++++++++-------
kernel/bpf/cpumap.c | 5 ++---
kernel/bpf/devmap.c | 3 ++-
kernel/bpf/sockmap.c | 3 ++-
4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
index 7c25426d3cf5..deaad334a100 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -117,15 +117,20 @@ static void *array_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key)
{
struct bpf_array *array = container_of(map, struct bpf_array, map);
u32 index = *(u32 *)key;
+ void *ptr, *high;
if (unlikely(index >= array->map.max_entries))
return NULL;
- return array->value + array->elem_size * index;
+ ptr = array->value + array->elem_size * index;
+ high = array->value + array->elem_size * array->map.max_entries;
+
+ return nospec_ptr(ptr, array->value, high);
}
/* emit BPF instructions equivalent to C code of array_map_lookup_elem() */
-static u32 array_map_gen_lookup(struct bpf_map *map, struct bpf_insn *insn_buf)
+static u32 __maybe_unused array_map_gen_lookup(struct bpf_map *map,
+ struct bpf_insn *insn_buf)
{
struct bpf_insn *insn = insn_buf;
u32 elem_size = round_up(map->value_size, 8);
@@ -153,11 +158,14 @@ static void *percpu_array_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key)
{
struct bpf_array *array = container_of(map, struct bpf_array, map);
u32 index = *(u32 *)key;
+ void __percpu *pptr;
if (unlikely(index >= array->map.max_entries))
return NULL;
- return this_cpu_ptr(array->pptrs[index]);
+ pptr = nospec_array_ptr(array->pptrs, index, array->map.max_entries);
+
+ return this_cpu_ptr(pptr);
}
int bpf_percpu_array_copy(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value)
@@ -302,7 +310,6 @@ const struct bpf_map_ops array_map_ops = {
.map_lookup_elem = array_map_lookup_elem,
.map_update_elem = array_map_update_elem,
.map_delete_elem = array_map_delete_elem,
- .map_gen_lookup = array_map_gen_lookup,
};
const struct bpf_map_ops percpu_array_map_ops = {
@@ -610,8 +617,8 @@ static void *array_of_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key)
return READ_ONCE(*inner_map);
}
-static u32 array_of_map_gen_lookup(struct bpf_map *map,
- struct bpf_insn *insn_buf)
+static u32 __maybe_unused array_of_map_gen_lookup(struct bpf_map *map,
+ struct bpf_insn *insn_buf)
{
u32 elem_size = round_up(map->value_size, 8);
struct bpf_insn *insn = insn_buf;
@@ -644,5 +651,4 @@ const struct bpf_map_ops array_of_maps_map_ops = {
.map_fd_get_ptr = bpf_map_fd_get_ptr,
.map_fd_put_ptr = bpf_map_fd_put_ptr,
.map_fd_sys_lookup_elem = bpf_map_fd_sys_lookup_elem,
- .map_gen_lookup = array_of_map_gen_lookup,
};
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c b/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c
index ce5b669003b2..6769a0e30c8c 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c
@@ -551,13 +551,12 @@ void cpu_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
struct bpf_cpu_map_entry *__cpu_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, u32 key)
{
struct bpf_cpu_map *cmap = container_of(map, struct bpf_cpu_map, map);
- struct bpf_cpu_map_entry *rcpu;
if (key >= map->max_entries)
return NULL;
- rcpu = READ_ONCE(cmap->cpu_map[key]);
- return rcpu;
+ return READ_ONCE(*nospec_array_ptr(cmap->cpu_map, key,
+ map->max_entries));
}
static void *cpu_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/devmap.c b/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
index ebdef54bf7df..5a1050d270a0 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
@@ -254,7 +254,8 @@ struct net_device *__dev_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, u32 key)
if (key >= map->max_entries)
return NULL;
- dev = READ_ONCE(dtab->netdev_map[key]);
+ dev = READ_ONCE(*nospec_array_ptr(dtab->netdev_map, key,
+ map->max_entries));
return dev ? dev->dev : NULL;
}
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/sockmap.c b/kernel/bpf/sockmap.c
index 5ee2e41893d9..e912de3cd4ce 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/sockmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/sockmap.c
@@ -630,7 +630,8 @@ struct sock *__sock_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, u32 key)
if (key >= map->max_entries)
return NULL;
- return READ_ONCE(stab->sock_map[key]);
+ return READ_ONCE(*nospec_array_ptr(stab->sock_map, key,
+ map->max_entries));
}
static int sock_map_delete_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key)
--
2.11.0
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