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Message-ID: <CAPcyv4hUAzCxH4sQAJgocFZ4RN2s6P_6+PO5xqYXU5R+O=coUQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 08:38:43 -0800
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: Re: [RFCv2 4/4] bpf: inhibit speculated out-of-bounds pointers
On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:57 AM, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com> wrote:
> Note: this patch is an *example* use of the nospec API. It is understood
> that this is incomplete, etc.
>
> Under speculation, CPUs may mis-predict branches in bounds checks. Thus,
> memory accesses under a bounds check may be speculated even if the
> bounds check fails, providing a primitive for building a side channel.
>
> The EBPF map code has a number of such bounds-checks accesses in
> map_lookup_elem implementations. This patch modifies these to use the
> nospec helpers to inhibit such side channels.
>
> The JITted lookup_elem implementations remain potentially vulnerable,
> and are disabled (with JITted code falling back to the C
> implementations).
Do we still need this given this patch from the bpf folks:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/855911/
?
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