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Message-ID: <e567c704-e141-63db-5d59-7294e0c78e26@linux.intel.com>
Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 10:59:06 -0800
From: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>
To: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@...il.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, peterz@...radead.org,
Alan Cox <alan.cox@...el.com>,
Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Solomon Peachy <pizza@...ftnet.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@...glemail.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
"James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
x86@...nel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@....inr.ac.ru>,
Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@...el.com>, linux-media@...r.kernel.org,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.com>,
Eduardo Valentin <edubezval@...il.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, qla2xxx-upstream@...gic.com,
tglx@...utronix.de, Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@...nel.org>,
Kalle Valo <kvalo@...eaurora.org>, alan@...ux.intel.com,
"Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@...cle.com>,
Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org>,
gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, linux-wireless@...r.kernel.org,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@...asonboard.com>,
dan.carpenter@...cle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative
execution
> It sounds like Coverity was used to produce these patches? If so, is
> there a plan to have smatch (hey Dan) or other open source static
> analysis tool be possibly enhanced to do a similar type of work?
I'd love for that to happen; the tricky part is being able to have even a
sort of sensible concept of "trusted" vs "untrusted" value...
if you look at a very small window of code, that does not work well;
you likely need to even look (as tool) across .c file boundaries
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