linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/6] x86/arch_prctl: add ARCH_GET_NOPTI and ARCH_SET

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Message-ID: <CALCETrU_Qt+0k4GO2qp=9D7h5czp0QkY=D9Y4AUfs9yzpNHswQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 9 Jan 2018 13:26:57 -0800
From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To:     Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>
Cc:     Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/6] x86/arch_prctl: add ARCH_GET_NOPTI and
 ARCH_SET_NOPTI to enable/disable PTI

On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 6:54 AM, Willy Tarreau <w@....eu> wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 03:51:57PM +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
>> On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 03:36:53PM +0100, Willy Tarreau wrote:
>> > I see and am not particularly against this, but what use case do you
>> > have in mind precisely ? I doubt it's just saving a few tens of bytes,
>> > so probably you're more concerned about the potential risks this opens ?
>> > But given we only allow this for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and these ones already
>> > have access to /dev/mem and many other things, don't you think there
>> > are much easier ways to dump kernel memory in this case than trying to
>> > inject some meltdown code into the victim process ? Or maybe you have
>> > other cases in mind that I'm not seeing.
>>
>> I'd like this to be config-controllable so that distros can make the
>> decision whether/if they want to support the whole per-mm thing.
>
> OK.
>
>> Also, if CAP_SYS_RAWIO is going to protect, please make the
>> ARCH_GET_NOPTI variant check it too.
>
> Interestingly I removed the check consecutive to the discussions. But
> I think I'll simply remove the whole ARCH_GET_NOPTI as it has no real
> value beyond initial development.
>

I've thought about this a bit more.  Here are my thoughts:

1. I don't like it being per-mm.  I think it should be a per-thread
control so that a program can have a thread with PTI that runs
less-trusted JavaScript and other network threads with PTI off.
Obviously we lose NX protection mm-wide if any threads have PTI off.
I think the way to implement this is:

Have this in struct mm_context:

bool has_non_pti_thread;

To turn PTI off on a thread:

Take pagetable_lock.
if (!has_non_pti_thread) {
  context.has_non_pti_thread = true;
  clear the NX bits;
}
drop pagetable_lock;
set the TI flag;

Fork clears the per-mm flag in the new mm.  Exec clears it, too.  I
think that's all that's needed.  Newly created threads always have PTI
on.

To turn PTI back on, just clear the TI flag.

2.Turning off PTI is, in general, a terrible idea.  It totally breaks
any semblance of a security model on a Meltdown-affected CPU.  So I
think we should require CAP_SYS_RAWIO *and* that the system is booted
with pti=allow_optout or something like that.

--Andy