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Message-ID: <20180109212940.ffvqb6wmehmxre4i@pd.tnic>
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 22:29:40 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/6] x86/arch_prctl: add ARCH_GET_NOPTI and
ARCH_SET_NOPTI to enable/disable PTI
On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 01:26:57PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> 2.Turning off PTI is, in general, a terrible idea. It totally breaks
> any semblance of a security model on a Meltdown-affected CPU. So I
> think we should require CAP_SYS_RAWIO *and* that the system is booted
> with pti=allow_optout or something like that.
Uhh, I like that.
Maybe also taint the kernel ...
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
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