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Message-ID: <a8b043b5-84a9-af92-ffcc-4b9c68f6917d@linux.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 10:38:07 -0800
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 6/6] x86/entry/pti: don't switch PGD on when
pti_disable is set
On 01/11/2018 10:32 AM, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
>> hmm. Exposing cr3 to user space will make it trivial for user process
>> to know whether kpti is active. Not sure how exploitable such
>> information leak.
> It's already trivial to detect PTI from user space.
Do tell.
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