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Message-ID: <75ceffe7-5035-dbb4-6027-91daa4e7fa94@amd.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 09:31:02 -0600
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@...el.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/5] x86/feature: Detect the x86 feature Indirect Branch
Prediction Barrier
On 1/11/2018 7:32 PM, Ashok Raj wrote:
> cpuid ax=0x7, return rdx bit 26 to indicate presence of both
> IA32_SPEC_CTRL(MSR 0x48) and IA32_PRED_CMD(MSR 0x49)
>
> BIT0: Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier
>
> When this MSR is written with IBPB=1 it ensures that earlier code's behavior
> doesn't control later indirect branch predictions.
>
> Note this MSR is only writable and does not carry any state. Its a barrier
> so the code should perform a wrmsr when the barrier is needed.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 3 +++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c | 7 +++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 10 ++++++++++
> 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index 624b58e..52f37fc 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -213,6 +213,7 @@
> #define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
> #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+19) /* Speculation Control */
> #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_IBRS ( 7*32+20) /* Speculation Control, use IBRS */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_PRED_CMD ( 7*32+21) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
>
> /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
> #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> index 3e1cb18..1888e19 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> @@ -46,6 +46,9 @@
> #define SPEC_CTRL_DISABLE_IBRS (0 << 0)
> #define SPEC_CTRL_ENABLE_IBRS (1 << 0)
>
> +#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049
> +#define FEATURE_SET_IBPB (1<<0)
> +
> #define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0 0x000000c1
> #define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR1 0x000000c2
> #define MSR_FSB_FREQ 0x000000cd
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c
> index 02fc630..6cfec19 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c
> @@ -15,6 +15,13 @@ void spec_ctrl_scan_feature(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> if (!c->cpu_index)
> static_branch_enable(&spec_ctrl_dynamic_ibrs);
> }
> + /*
> + * For Intel CPU's this MSR is shared the same cpuid
> + * enumeration. When MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL is present
> + * MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL is also available
> + * TBD: AMD might have a separate enumeration for each.
AMD will follow the specification that if cpuid ax=0x7, return rdx[26]
is set, it will indicate both MSR registers and features are supported.
But AMD also has a separate bit for IBPB (X86_FEATURE_PRED_CMD) alone.
As all of the IBRS/IBPB stuff happens, that patch will follow.
> + */
> + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_PRED_CMD);> }
> }
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> index 7c14471a..36924c9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> @@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs {
> { .index = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, .always = true },
> #endif
> { .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, .always = true },
> + { .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, .always = false },
This should be .always = true
> { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, .always = false },
> { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, .always = false },
> { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, .always = false },
> @@ -531,6 +532,7 @@ struct svm_cpu_data {
> struct kvm_ldttss_desc *tss_desc;
>
> struct page *save_area;
> + struct vmcb *current_vmcb;
> };
>
> static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data *, svm_data);
> @@ -923,6 +925,8 @@ static void svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(u32 *msrpm)
>
> if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
> set_msr_interception(msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1);
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PRED_CMD))
> + set_msr_interception(msrpm, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, 1, 1);
Similar to the comment about SPEC_CTRL, this should be removed as it will
be covered by the loop.
> }
>
> static void add_msr_offset(u32 offset)
> @@ -1711,11 +1715,18 @@ static void svm_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> __free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->nested.msrpm), MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER);
> kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
> kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, svm);
> + /*
> + * The VMCB could be recycled, causing a false negative in svm_vcpu_load;
> + * block speculative execution.
> + */
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PRED_CMD))
> + native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
> }
>
> static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
> {
> struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> + struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
> int i;
>
> if (unlikely(cpu != vcpu->cpu)) {
> @@ -1744,6 +1755,11 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
> if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
> wrmsrl(MSR_TSC_AUX, svm->tsc_aux);
>
> + if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) {
> + sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb;
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PRED_CMD))
> + native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
> + }
> avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
> }
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> index 1913896..caeb9ff 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> @@ -2280,6 +2280,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
> if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) {
> per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
> vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
This should probably use X86_FEATURE_PRED_CMD.
> + native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);> }
>
> if (!already_loaded) {
> @@ -3837,6 +3839,12 @@ static void free_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
> free_vmcs(loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
> loaded_vmcs->vmcs = NULL;
> WARN_ON(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs != NULL);
> + /*
> + * The VMCS could be recycled, causing a false negative in vmx_vcpu_load
> + * block speculative execution.
> + */
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
Again, X86_FEATURE_PRED_CMD.
> + native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
> }
>
> static void free_kvm_area(void)
> @@ -6804,6 +6812,8 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
> */
> if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
> vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, false);
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PRED_CMD))
> + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, false);
>
> vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_FS_BASE, false);
> vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_GS_BASE, false);
>
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