[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20180112203427.GA9109@avx2>
Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 23:34:27 +0300
From: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>
To: akpm@...ux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] elf: fix NT_FILE integer overflow
If vm.max_map_count bumped above 2^26 (67+ mil) and system has enough
RAM to allocate all the VMAs (~12.8 GB on Fedora 27 with 200-byte VMAs),
then it should be possible to overflow 32-bit "size", pass paranoia check,
allocate very little vmalloc space and oops while writing into vmalloc
guard page...
But I didn't test this, only coredump of regular process.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>
---
fs/binfmt_elf.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
@@ -1599,6 +1599,8 @@ static int fill_files_note(struct memelfnote *note)
/* *Estimated* file count and total data size needed */
count = current->mm->map_count;
+ if (count > UINT_MAX / 64)
+ return -EINVAL;
size = count * 64;
names_ofs = (2 + 3 * count) * sizeof(data[0]);
Powered by blists - more mailing lists