[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLm_SO=WV1Wg6NJ6r4CZgiuut29awBAHXhvjRprOLYEWQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 20 Jan 2018 17:22:07 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: David Windsor <dave@...lcore.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>,
Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>, Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 0/3] exec: Pin stack limit during exec
On Fri, Jan 19, 2018 at 5:12 PM, David Windsor <dave@...lcore.net> wrote:
> I have some spare cycles; is there any more relevant information outside of this thread?
Awesome, thanks! Context is in the other commits, but mainly I want to
double-check that nothing breaks with these changes, and that all the
races for changing stack rlimits during exec are fixed. And then, just
a sanity-check that the design approach to attaching the stack limit
to the bprm isn't crazy. :)
-Kees
>>> [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()")
>>> [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"")
>>> [3] to security@...nel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?"
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
Powered by blists - more mailing lists