[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1801240003260.11852@cbobk.fhfr.pm>
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2018 00:06:54 +0100 (CET)
From: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, Paul Turner <pjt@...gle.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...ux-foundation.org>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk, x86@...nel.org,
thomas.lendacky@....com, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 04/12] x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select
Spectre v2 mitigation
On Tue, 23 Jan 2018, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> So that vermagic patch doesn't really help anything in real world (FWIW
> I've just dropped it from SLE kernel). "Potentially insecure" doesn't mean
> it shouldn't be loaded if the user wishes so. Only "functionally
> incorrect" (which is the kernel ABI compatibility check) should be the
> show stopper.
... one of the supporting arguments here obviously is: those external
modules are quite often opening so many *other* holes into the system,
that refusing to load it *just* because of kernel being retpolined while
the module is not sounds more like not lettting a drunk and armed
terrorist drive a plane, with the justification being the lack of a proper
stamped license.
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
Powered by blists - more mailing lists