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Message-ID: <20180124204622.1f7b0de2@alans-desktop>
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2018 20:46:22 +0000
From: Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
kvm@...r.kernel.org, Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Cornelia Huck <cohuck@...hat.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Jon Masters <jcm@...hat.com>,
Marcus Meissner <meissner@...e.de>,
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>, w@....eu, keescook@...omium.org,
thomas.lendacky@....com, dwmw@...zon.co.uk, ak@...ux.intel.com
Subject: Re: Avoiding information leaks between users and between processes
by default? [Was: : [PATCH 1/5] prctl: add PR_ISOLATE_BP process control]
> Anyway, no need to add prctl(), if A can ptrace B and B can ptrace A,
> leaking info between them should not be a big deal. You can probably
> find existing macros doing neccessary checks.
Until one of them is security managed so it shouldn't be able to ptrace
the other, or (and this is the nasty one) when a process is executing
code it wants to protect from the rest of the same process (eg an
untrusted jvm, javascript or probably nastiest of all webassembly)
We don't need a prctl for trusted/untrusted IMHO but we do eventually
need to think about API's for "this lot is me but I don't trust
it" (flatpack, docker, etc) and for what JIT engines need to do.
Alan
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