linux-kernel - Re: Avoiding information leaks between users and between processes by default? [Was: : [PATCH 1/5] prctl: add PR_ISOLATE

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Message-ID: <20180129131446.GB4669@amd>
Date:   Mon, 29 Jan 2018 14:14:46 +0100
From:   Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To:     Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc:     Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>,
        Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org, Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>,
        Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Cornelia Huck <cohuck@...hat.com>,
        David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Jon Masters <jcm@...hat.com>,
        Marcus Meissner <meissner@...e.de>,
        Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>, w@....eu, keescook@...omium.org,
        thomas.lendacky@....com, dwmw@...zon.co.uk, ak@...ux.intel.com
Subject: Re: Avoiding information leaks between users and between processes
 by default? [Was: : [PATCH 1/5] prctl: add PR_ISOLATE_BP process control]

On Wed 2018-01-24 20:46:22, Alan Cox wrote:
> > Anyway, no need to add prctl(), if A can ptrace B and B can ptrace A,
> > leaking info between them should not be a big deal. You can probably
> > find existing macros doing neccessary checks.
> 
> Until one of them is security managed so it shouldn't be able to ptrace
> the other, or (and this is the nasty one) when a process is executing
> code it wants to protect from the rest of the same process (eg an
> untrusted jvm, javascript or probably nastiest of all webassembly)
> 
> We don't need a prctl for trusted/untrusted IMHO but we do eventually
> need to think about API's for "this lot is me but I don't trust
> it" (flatpack, docker, etc) and for what JIT engines need to do.

Agreed.

And yes, JITs are interesting, and given the latest
rowhammer/sidechannel attacks, something we may want to limit in
future...

It sounds nice on paper but is just risky.
									Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

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