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Message-ID: <20180130184917.GA32095@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 13:49:17 -0500
From: Konstantin Ryabitsev <konstantin@...uxfoundation.org>
To: corbet@....net
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] Documentation/process: kernel maintainer PGP guide
This guide is an adapted version of the more general "Protecting Code
Integrity" guide written and maintained by The Linux Foundation IT for
use with open-source projects. It provides the oft-lacking guidance on
the following topics:
- how to properly protect one's PGP keys to minimize the risks of them
being stolen and used maliciously to impersonate a kernel developer
- how to configure Git to properly use GnuPG
- when and how to use PGP with Git
- how to verify fellow Linux Kernel developer identities
I believe this document should live with the rest of the documentation
describing proper processes one should follow when participating in
kernel development. Placing it in a wiki on some place like kernel.org
would be insufficient for a number of reasons -- primarily, because only
a relatively small subset of maintainers have accounts on kernel.org,
but also because even those who do rarely remember that such wiki
exists. Keeping it with the rest of in-kernel docs should hopefully give
it more visibility, but also help keep it up-to-date as tools and
processes evolve.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Ryabitsev <konstantin@...uxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/process/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/process/maintainer-pgp-guide.rst | 899 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 900 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/process/maintainer-pgp-guide.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/process/index.rst b/Documentation/process/index.rst
index a430f6eee756..1c9fe657ed01 100644
--- a/Documentation/process/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/process/index.rst
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ Below are the essential guides that every developer should read.
development-process
submitting-patches
coding-style
+ maintainer-pgp-guide
email-clients
kernel-enforcement-statement
kernel-driver-statement
diff --git a/Documentation/process/maintainer-pgp-guide.rst b/Documentation/process/maintainer-pgp-guide.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..21ec9169a4d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/process/maintainer-pgp-guide.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,899 @@
+===========================
+Kernel Maintainer PGP guide
+===========================
+
+This document is aimed at Linux kernel developers, and especially
+subsystem maintainers. It contains a subset of information discussed in
+the more general "`Protecting Code Integrity`_" guide published by the
+Linux Foundation. Please read that document for more in-depth discussion
+on some of the topics mentioned in this guide.
+
+.. _`Protecting Code Integrity`: https://github.com/lfit/itpol/blob/master/protecting-code-integrity.md
+
+The role of PGP in Linux Kernel development
+===========================================
+
+PGP helps ensure the integrity of the code that is produced by the Linux
+Kernel development community and, to a lesser degree, establish trusted
+communication channels between developers via PGP-signed email exchange.
+
+The Linux Kernel source code is available in two main formats:
+
+- Distributed source repositories (git)
+- Periodic release snapshots (tarballs)
+
+Both git repositories and tarballs carry PGP signatures of the kernel
+developers who create official kernel releases. These signatures offer a
+cryptographic guarantee that downloadable versions made available via
+kernel.org or any other mirrors are identical to what these developers
+have on their workstations. To this end:
+
+- git repositories provide PGP signatures on all tags
+- tarballs provide detached PGP signatures with all downloads
+
+Trusting the developers, not infrastructure
+-------------------------------------------
+
+Ever since the 2011 compromise of core kernel.org systems, the main
+operating principle of the Kernel Archives project has been to assume
+that any part of the infrastructure can be compromised at any time. For
+this reason, the administrators have taken deliberate steps to emphasize
+that trust must always be placed with developers and never with the code
+hosting infrastructure, regardless of how good the security practices
+for the latter may be.
+
+The above guiding principle is the reason why this guide is needed. We
+want to make sure that by placing trust into developers we do not simply
+shift the blame for potential future security incidents to someone else.
+The goal is to provide a set of guidelines developers can use to create
+a secure working environment and safeguard the PGP keys used to
+establish the integrity of the Linux Kernel itself.
+
+PGP tools
+=========
+
+Use GnuPG v2
+------------
+
+Your distro should already have GnuPG installed by default, you just
+need to verify that you are using version 2.x and not the legacy 1.4
+release -- many distributions still package both, with the default
+``gpg`` command invoking GnuPG v.1. To check, run::
+
+ $ gpg --version | head -n1
+
+If you see ``gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.x``, then you are using GnuPG v.1. Try the
+``gpg2`` command (if you don't have it, you may need to install the
+gnupg2 package)::
+
+ $ gpg2 --version | head -n1
+
+If you see ``gpg (GnuPG) 2.x.x``, then you are good to go. This guide
+will assume you have the version 2.2 of GnuPG (or later). If you are
+using version 2.0 of GnuPG, then some of the commands in this guide will
+not work, and you should consider installing the latest 2.2 version of
+GnuPG. Versions of gnupg-2.1.11 and later should be compatible for the
+purposes of this guide as well.
+
+If you have both ``gpg`` and ``gpg2`` commands, you should make sure you
+are always using GnuPG v2, not the legacy version. You can enforce this
+by setting the appropriate alias::
+
+ $ alias gpg=gpg2
+
+You can put that in your ``.bashrc`` to make sure it's always the case.
+
+Configure gpg-agent options
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The GnuPG agent is a helper tool that will start automatically whenever
+you use the ``gpg`` command and run in the background with the purpose
+of caching the private key passphrase. There are two options you should
+know in order to tweak when the passphrase should be expired from cache:
+
+- ``default-cache-ttl`` (seconds): If you use the same key again before
+ the time-to-live expires, the countdown will reset for another period.
+ The default is 600 (10 minutes).
+- ``max-cache-ttl`` (seconds): Regardless of how recently you've used
+ the key since initial passphrase entry, if the maximum time-to-live
+ countdown expires, you'll have to enter the passphrase again. The
+ default is 30 minutes.
+
+If you find either of these defaults too short (or too long), you can
+edit your ``~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf`` file to set your own values::
+
+ # set to 30 minutes for regular ttl, and 2 hours for max ttl
+ default-cache-ttl 1800
+ max-cache-ttl 7200
+
+.. note::
+
+ It is no longer necessary to start gpg-agent manually at the
+ beginning of your shell session. You may want to check your rc files
+ to remove anything you had in place for older versions of GnuPG, as
+ it may not be doing the right thing any more.
+
+Set up a refresh cronjob
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+You will need to regularly refresh your keyring in order to get the
+latest changes on other people's public keys, which is best done with a
+daily cronjob::
+
+ @daily /usr/bin/gpg2 --refresh >/dev/null 2>&1
+
+Check the full path to your ``gpg`` or ``gpg2`` command and use the
+``gpg2`` command if regular ``gpg`` for you is the legacy GnuPG v.1.
+
+Protect your master PGP key
+===========================
+
+This guide assumes that you already have a PGP key that you use for Linux
+Kernel development purposes. If you do not yet have one, please see the
+"`Protecting Code Integrity`_" document mentioned earlier for guidance
+on how to create a new one.
+
+You should also make a new key if your current one is weaker than 2048 bits
+(RSA).
+
+Master key vs. Subkeys
+----------------------
+
+It is important to understand the following:
+
+1. There are no technical differences between the "master key" and "subkeys."
+2. At creation time, we assign functional limitations to each key by
+ giving it specific capabilities.
+3. A PGP key can have 4 capabilities:
+
+ - **[S]** key can be used for signing
+ - **[E]** key can be used for encryption
+ - **[A]** key can be used for authentication
+ - **[C]** key can be used for certifying other keys
+
+4. A single key may have multiple capabilities.
+5. A subkey is fully independent from the master key. A message
+ encrypted to a subkey cannot be decrypted with the master key. If you
+ lose your private subkey, it cannot be recreated from the master key
+ in any way.
+
+The key carrying the **[C]** (certify) capability is considered the
+"master" key because it is the only key that can be used to indicate
+relationship with other keys. Only the **[C]** key can be used to:
+
+- add or revoke other keys (subkeys) with S/E/A capabilities
+- add, change or revoke identities (uids) associated with the key
+- add or change the expiration date on itself or any subkey
+- sign other people's keys for web of trust purposes
+
+By default, GnuPG creates the following when generating new keys:
+
+- A master key carrying both Certify and Sign capabilities (**[SC]**)
+- A separate subkey with the Encryption capability (**[E]**)
+
+If you used the default parameters when generating your key, then that
+is what you will have. You can verify by running ``gpg --list-secret-keys``,
+for example::
+
+ sec rsa2048 2018-01-23 [SC] [expires: 2020-01-23]
+ 000000000000000000000000AAAABBBBCCCCDDDD
+ uid [ultimate] Alice Dev <adev@...nel.org>
+ ssb rsa2048 2018-01-23 [E] [expires: 2020-01-23]
+
+Any key carrying the **[C]** capability is your master key, regardless
+of any other capabilities it may have assigned to it.
+
+The long line under the ``sec`` entry is your key fingerprint --
+whenever you see ``[fpr]`` in the examples below, that 40-character
+string is what it refers to.
+
+Ensure your passphrase is strong
+--------------------------------
+
+GnuPG uses passphrases to encrypt your private keys before storing them on
+disk. This way, even if your ``.gnupg`` directory is leaked or stolen in
+its entirety, the attackers cannot use your private keys without first
+obtaining the passphrase to decrypt them.
+
+It is absolutely essential that your private keys are protected by a
+strong passphrase. To set it or change it, use::
+
+ $ gpg --change-passphrase [fpr]
+
+Create a separate Signing subkey
+--------------------------------
+
+Our goal is to protect your master key by moving it to offline media, so
+if you only have a combined **[SC]** key, then you should create a separate
+signing subkey::
+
+ $ gpg --quick-add-key [fpr] ed25519 sign
+
+Remember to tell the keyservers about this change, so others can pull down
+your new subkey::
+
+ $ gpg --send-key [fpr]
+
+.. note:: ECC support in GnuPG
+
+ GnuPG 2.1 and later has full support for Elliptic Curve
+ Cryptography, with ability to combine ECC subkeys with traditional
+ RSA master keys. The main upside of ECC cryptography is that it is
+ much faster computationally and creates much smaller signatures when
+ compared byte for byte with 2048+ bit RSA keys. Unless you plan on
+ using a smartcard device that does not support ECC operations, we
+ recommend that you create an ECC signing subkey for your kernel
+ work.
+
+ If for some reason you prefer to stay with RSA subkeys, just replace
+ "ed25519" with "rsa2048" in the above command.
+
+
+Back up your master key for disaster recovery
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The more signatures you have on your PGP key from other developers, the
+more reasons you have to create a backup version that lives on something
+other than digital media, for disaster recovery reasons.
+
+The best way to create a printable hardcopy of your private key is by
+using the ``paperkey`` software written for this very purpose. See ``man
+paperkey`` for more details on the output format and its benefits over
+other solutions. Paperkey should already be packaged for most
+distributions.
+
+Run the following command to create a hardcopy backup of your private
+key::
+
+ $ gpg --export-secret-key [fpr] | paperkey > /tmp/key-backup.txt
+
+Print out that file (or pipe the output straight to lpr), then take a
+pen and write your passphrase on the margin of the paper. **This is
+strongly recommended** because the key printout is still encrypted with
+that passphrase, and if you ever change it you will not remember what it
+used to be when you had created the backup -- *guaranteed*.
+
+Put the resulting printout and the hand-written passphrase into an envelope
+and store in a secure and well-protected place, preferably away from your
+home, such as your bank vault.
+
+.. note::
+
+ Your printer is probably no longer a simple dumb device connected to
+ your parallel port, but since the output is still encrypted with
+ your passphrase, printing out even to "cloud-integrated" modern
+ printers should remain a relatively safe operation. One option is to
+ change the passphrase on your master key immediately after you are
+ done with paperkey.
+
+Back up your whole GnuPG directory
+----------------------------------
+
+.. warning::
+
+ **!!!Do not skip this step!!!**
+
+It is important to have a readily available backup of your PGP keys
+should you need to recover them. This is different from the
+disaster-level preparedness we did with ``paperkey``. You will also rely
+on these external copies whenever you need to use your Certify key --
+such as when making changes to your own key or signing other people's
+keys after conferences and summits.
+
+Start by getting a small USB "thumb" drive (preferably two!) that you
+will use for backup purposes. You will need to encrypt them using LUKS
+-- refer to your distro's documentation on how to accomplish this.
+
+For the encryption passphrase, you can use the same one as on your
+master key.
+
+Once the encryption process is over, re-insert the USB drive and make
+sure it gets properly mounted. Copy your entire ``.gnupg`` directory
+over to the encrypted storage::
+
+ $ cp -a ~/.gnupg /media/disk/foo/gnupg-backup
+
+You should now test to make sure everything still works::
+
+ $ gpg --homedir=/media/disk/foo/gnupg-backup --list-key [fpr]
+
+If you don't get any errors, then you should be good to go. Unmount the
+USB drive, distinctly label it so you don't blow it away next time you
+need to use a random USB drive, and put in a safe place -- but not too
+far away, because you'll need to use it every now and again for things
+like editing identities, adding or revoking subkeys, or signing other
+people's keys.
+
+Remove the master key from your homedir
+----------------------------------------
+
+The files in our home directory are not as well protected as we like to
+think. They can be leaked or stolen via many different means:
+
+- by accident when making quick homedir copies to set up a new workstation
+- by systems administrator negligence or malice
+- via poorly secured backups
+- via malware in desktop apps (browsers, pdf viewers, etc)
+- via coercion when crossing international borders
+
+Protecting your key with a good passphrase greatly helps reduce the risk
+of any of the above, but passphrases can be discovered via keyloggers,
+shoulder-surfing, or any number of other means. For this reason, the
+recommended setup is to remove your master key from your home directory
+and store it on offline storage.
+
+.. warning::
+
+ Please see the previous section and make sure you have backed up
+ your GnuPG directory in its entirety. What we are about to do will
+ render your key useless if you do not have a usable backup!
+
+First, identify the keygrip of your master key::
+
+ $ gpg --with-keygrip --list-key [fpr]
+
+The output will be something like this::
+
+ pub rsa2048 2018-01-24 [SC] [expires: 2020-01-24]
+ 000000000000000000000000AAAABBBBCCCCDDDD
+ Keygrip = 1111000000000000000000000000000000000000
+ uid [ultimate] Alice Dev <adev@...nel.org>
+ sub rsa2048 2018-01-24 [E] [expires: 2020-01-24]
+ Keygrip = 2222000000000000000000000000000000000000
+ sub ed25519 2018-01-24 [S]
+ Keygrip = 3333000000000000000000000000000000000000
+
+Find the keygrip entry that is beneath the ``pub`` line (right under the
+master key fingerprint). This will correspond directly to a file in your
+``~/.gnupg`` directory::
+
+ $ cd ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d
+ $ ls
+ 1111000000000000000000000000000000000000.key
+ 2222000000000000000000000000000000000000.key
+ 3333000000000000000000000000000000000000.key
+
+All you have to do is simply remove the .key file that corresponds to
+the master keygrip::
+
+ $ cd ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d
+ $ rm 1111000000000000000000000000000000000000.key
+
+Now, if you issue the ``--list-secret-keys`` command, it will show that
+the master key is missing (the ``#`` indicates it is not available)::
+
+ $ gpg --list-secret-keys
+ sec# rsa2048 2018-01-24 [SC] [expires: 2020-01-24]
+ 000000000000000000000000AAAABBBBCCCCDDDD
+ uid [ultimate] Alice Dev <adev@...nel.org>
+ ssb rsa2048 2018-01-24 [E] [expires: 2020-01-24]
+ ssb ed25519 2018-01-24 [S]
+
+You should also remove any ``secring.gpg`` files in the ``~/.gnupg``
+directory, which are left over from earlier versions of GnuPG.
+
+If you don't have the "private-keys-v1.d" directory
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+If you do not have a ``~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d`` directory, then your
+secret keys are still stored in the legacy ``secring.gpg`` file used by
+GnuPG v1. Making any changes to your key, such as changing the
+passphrase or adding a subkey, should automatically convert the old
+``secring.gpg`` format to use ``private-keys-v1.d`` instead.
+
+Once you get that done, make sure to delete the obsolete ``secring.gpg``
+file, which still contains your private keys.
+
+Move the subkeys to a dedicated crypto device
+=============================================
+
+Even though the master key is now safe from being leaked or stolen, the
+subkeys are still in your home directory. Anyone who manages to get
+their hands on those will be able to decrypt your communication or fake
+your signatures (if they know the passphrase). Furthermore, each time a
+GnuPG operation is performed, the keys are loaded into system memory and
+can be stolen from there by sufficiently advanced malware (think
+Meltdown and Spectre).
+
+The best way to completely protect your keys is to move them to a
+specialized hardware device that is capable of smartcard operations.
+
+The benefits of smartcards
+--------------------------
+
+A smartcard contains a cryptographic chip that is capable of storing
+private keys and performing crypto operations directly on the card
+itself. Because the key contents never leave the smartcard, the
+operating system of the computer into which you plug in the hardware
+device is not able to retrieve the private keys themselves. This is very
+different from the encrypted USB storage device we used earlier for
+backup purposes -- while that USB device is plugged in and mounted, the
+operating system is able to access the private key contents.
+
+Using external encrypted USB media is not a substitute to having a
+smartcard-capable device.
+
+Available smartcard devices
+---------------------------
+
+Unless all your laptops and workstations have smartcard readers, the
+easiest is to get a specialized USB device that implements smartcard
+functionality. There are several options available:
+
+- `Nitrokey Start`_: Open hardware and Free Software, based on FSI
+ Japan's `Gnuk`_. Offers support for ECC keys, but fewest security
+ features (such as resistance to tampering or some side-channel
+ attacks).
+- `Nitrokey Pro`_: Similar to the Nitrokey Start, but more
+ tamper-resistant and offers more security features, but no ECC
+ support.
+- `Yubikey 4`_: hardware and software, but cheaper than Nitrokey Pro and
+ comes available in the USB-C form that is more useful with newer
+ laptops. Offers additional security features such as FIDO U2F, but no
+ ECC.
+
+`LWN has a good review`_ of some of the above models, as well as several
+others. If you want to use ECC keys, your best bet among commercially
+available devices is the Nitrokey Start.
+
+.. _`Nitrokey Start`: https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/product/nitrokey-start-6
+.. _`Nitrokey Pro`: https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/product/nitrokey-pro-3
+.. _`Yubikey 4`: https://www.yubico.com/product/yubikey-4-series/
+.. _Gnuk: http://www.fsij.org/doc-gnuk/
+.. _`LWN has a good review`: https://lwn.net/Articles/736231/
+
+Configure your smartcard device
+-------------------------------
+
+Your smartcard device should Just Work (TM) the moment you plug it into
+any modern Linux workstation. You can verify it by running::
+
+ $ gpg --card-status
+
+If you see full smartcard details, then you are good to go.
+Unfortunately, troubleshooting all possible reasons why things may not
+be working for you is way beyond the scope of this guide. If you are
+having trouble getting the card to work with GnuPG, please seek help via
+usual support channels.
+
+To configure your smartcard, you will need to use the GnuPG menu system, as
+there are no convenient command-line switches::
+
+ $ gpg --card-edit
+ [...omitted...]
+ gpg/card> admin
+ Admin commands are allowed
+ gpg/card> passwd
+
+You should set the user PIN (1), Admin PIN (3), and the Reset Code (4).
+Please make sure to record and store these in a safe place -- especially
+the Admin PIN and the Reset Code (which allows you to completely wipe
+the smartcard). You so rarely need to use the Admin PIN, that you will
+inevitably forget what it is if you do not record it.
+
+Getting back to the main card menu, you can also set other values (such
+as name, sex, login data, etc), but it's not necessary and will
+additionally leak information about your smartcard should you lose it.
+
+.. note::
+
+ Despite having the name "PIN", neither the user PIN nor the admin
+ PIN on the card need to be numbers.
+
+Move the subkeys to your smartcard
+----------------------------------
+
+Exit the card menu (using "q") and save all changes. Next, let's move
+your subkeys onto the smartcard. You will need both your PGP key
+passphrase and the admin PIN of the card for most operations::
+
+ $ gpg --edit-key [fpr]
+
+ Secret subkeys are available.
+
+ pub rsa2048/AAAABBBBCCCCDDDD
+ created: 2018-01-23 expires: 2020-01-23 usage: SC
+ trust: ultimate validity: ultimate
+ ssb rsa2048/1111222233334444
+ created: 2018-01-23 expires: never usage: E
+ ssb ed25519/5555666677778888
+ created: 2017-12-07 expires: never usage: S
+ [ultimate] (1). Alice Dev <adev@...nel.org>
+
+ gpg>
+
+Using ``--edit-key`` puts us into the menu mode again, and you will
+notice that the key listing is a little different. From here on, all
+commands are done from inside this menu mode, as indicated by ``gpg>``.
+
+First, let's select the key we'll be putting onto the card -- you do
+this by typing ``key 1`` (it's the first one in the listing, the **[E]**
+subkey)::
+
+ gpg> key 1
+
+In the output, you should now see ``ssb*`` on the **[E]** key. The ``*``
+indicates which key is currently "selected." It works as a *toggle*,
+meaning that if you type ``key 1`` again, the ``*`` will disappear and
+the key will not be selected any more.
+
+Now, let's move that key onto the smartcard::
+
+ gpg> keytocard
+ Please select where to store the key:
+ (2) Encryption key
+ Your selection? 2
+
+Since it's our **[E]** key, it makes sense to put it into the Encryption
+slot. When you submit your selection, you will be prompted first for
+your PGP key passphrase, and then for the admin PIN. If the command
+returns without an error, your key has been moved.
+
+**Important**: Now type ``key 1`` again to unselect the first key, and
+``key 2`` to select the **[S]** key::
+
+ gpg> key 1
+ gpg> key 2
+ gpg> keytocard
+ Please select where to store the key:
+ (1) Signature key
+ (3) Authentication key
+ Your selection? 1
+
+You can use the **[S]** key both for Signature and Authentication, but
+we want to make sure it's in the Signature slot, so choose (1). Once
+again, if your command returns without an error, then the operation was
+successful::
+
+ gpg> q
+ Save changes? (y/N) y
+
+Saving the changes will delete the keys you moved to the card from your
+home directory (but it's okay, because we have them in our backups
+should we need to do this again for a replacement smartcard).
+
+Verifying that the keys were moved
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+If you perform ``--list-secret-keys`` now, you will see a subtle
+difference in the output::
+
+ $ gpg --list-secret-keys
+ sec# rsa2048 2018-01-24 [SC] [expires: 2020-01-24]
+ 000000000000000000000000AAAABBBBCCCCDDDD
+ uid [ultimate] Alice Dev <adev@...nel.org>
+ ssb> rsa2048 2018-01-24 [E] [expires: 2020-01-24]
+ ssb> ed25519 2018-01-24 [S]
+
+The ``>`` in the ``ssb>`` output indicates that the subkey is only
+available on the smartcard. If you go back into your secret keys
+directory and look at the contents there, you will notice that the
+``.key`` files there have been replaced with stubs::
+
+ $ cd ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d
+ $ strings *.key | grep 'private-key'
+
+The output should contain ``shadowed-private-key`` to indicate that
+these files are only stubs and the actual content is on the smartcard.
+
+Verifying that the smartcard is functioning
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+To verify that the smartcard is working as intended, you can create a
+signature::
+
+ $ echo "Hello world" | gpg --clearsign > /tmp/test.asc
+ $ gpg --verify /tmp/test.asc
+
+This should ask for your smartcard PIN on your first command, and then
+show "Good signature" after you run ``gpg --verify``.
+
+Congratulations, you have successfully made it extremely difficult to
+steal your digital developer identity!
+
+Other common GnuPG operations
+-----------------------------
+
+Here is a quick reference for some common operations you'll need to do
+with your PGP key.
+
+Mounting your master key offline storage
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+You will need your master key for any of the operations below, so you
+will first need to mount your backup offline storage and tell GnuPG to
+use it::
+
+ $ export GNUPGHOME=/media/disk/foo/gnupg-backup
+ $ gpg --list-secret-keys
+
+You want to make sure that you see ``sec`` and not ``sec#`` in the
+output (the ``#`` means the key is not available and you're still using
+your regular home directory location).
+
+Extending key expiration date
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The master key has the default expiration date of 2 years from the date
+of creation. This is done both for security reasons and to make obsolete
+keys eventually disappear from keyservers.
+
+To extend the expiration on your key by a year from current date, just
+run::
+
+ $ gpg --quick-set-expire [fpr] 1y
+
+You can also use a specific date if that is easier to remember (e.g.
+your birthday, January 1st, or Canada Day)::
+
+ $ gpg --quick-set-expire [fpr] 2020-07-01
+
+Remember to send the updated key back to keyservers::
+
+ $ gpg --send-key [fpr]
+
+Updating your work directory after any changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+After you make any changes to your key using the offline storage, you will
+want to import these changes back into your regular working directory::
+
+ $ gpg --export | gpg --homedir ~/.gnupg --import
+ $ unset GNUPGHOME
+
+
+Using PGP with Git
+==================
+
+One of the core features of Git is its decentralized nature -- once a
+repository is cloned to your system, you have full history of the
+project, including all of its tags, commits and branches. However, with
+hundreds of cloned repositories floating around, how does anyone verify
+that their copy of linux.git has not been tampered with by a malicious
+third party?
+
+Or what happens if a backdoor is discovered in the code and the "Author"
+line in the commit says it was done by you, while you're pretty sure you
+had `nothing to do with it`_?
+
+To address both of these issues, Git introduced PGP integration. Signed
+tags prove the repository integrity by assuring that its contents are
+exactly the same as on the workstation of the developer who created the
+tag, while signed commits make it nearly impossible for someone to
+impersonate you without having access to your PGP keys.
+
+.. _`nothing to do with it`: https://github.com/jayphelps/git-blame-someone-else
+
+Configure git to use your PGP key
+---------------------------------
+
+If you only have one secret key in your keyring, then you don't really
+need to do anything extra, as it becomes your default key. However, if
+you happen to have multiple secret keys, you can tell git which key
+should be used (``[fpr]`` is the fingerprint of your key)::
+
+ $ git config --global user.signingKey [fpr]
+
+**IMPORTANT**: If you have a distinct ``gpg2`` command, then you should
+tell git to always use it instead of the legacy ``gpg`` from version 1::
+
+ $ git config --global gpg.program gpg2
+
+How to work with signed tags
+----------------------------
+
+To create a signed tag, simply pass the ``-s`` switch to the tag
+command::
+
+ $ git tag -s [tagname]
+
+Our recommendation is to always sign git tags, as this allows other
+developers to ensure that the git repository they are pulling from has
+not been maliciously altered.
+
+How to verify signed tags
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+To verify a signed tag, simply use the ``verify-tag`` command::
+
+ $ git verify-tag [tagname]
+
+If you are pulling a tag from another fork of the project repository,
+git should automatically verify the signature at the tip you're pulling
+and show you the results during the merge operation::
+
+ $ git pull [url] tags/sometag
+
+The merge message will contain something like this::
+
+ Merge tag 'sometag' of [url]
+
+ [Tag message]
+
+ # gpg: Signature made [...]
+ # gpg: Good signature from [...]
+
+If you are verifying someone else's git tag, then you will need to
+import their PGP key. Please refer to the "how to verify kernel
+developer identities" section below.
+
+Configure git to always sign annotated tags
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Chances are, if you're creating an annotated tag, you'll want to sign
+it. To force git to always sign annotated tags, you can set a global
+configuration option::
+
+ $ git config --global tag.forceSignAnnotated true
+
+How to work with signed commits
+-------------------------------
+
+It is easy to create signed commits, but it is much more difficult to
+use them in Linux Kernel development, since it relies on patches sent to
+the mailing list, and this workflow does not preserve PGP commit
+signatures.
+
+If you have your working git tree publicly available at some git hosting
+service (kernel.org, infradead.org, ozlabs.org, or others), then the
+recommendation is that you sign all your git commits even if upstream
+developers do not directly benefit from this practice. Should there ever
+be a need to perform code forensics or track code provenance, even
+externally maintained trees carrying PGP commit signatures will be
+extremely valuable for such purposes.
+
+Creating signed commits
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+To create a signed commit, you just need to pass the ``-S`` flag to the
+``git commit`` command (it's capital ``-S`` due to collision with
+another flag)::
+
+ $ git commit -S
+
+Configure git to always sign commits
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+You can tell git to always sign commits::
+
+ git config --global commit.gpgSign true
+
+How to verify kernel developer identities
+=========================================
+
+Signing tags and commits is easy, but how does one go about verifying
+that the key used to sign something belongs to the actual kernel
+developer and not to a malicious imposter?
+
+Configure auto-key-retrieval using WKD and DANE
+-----------------------------------------------
+
+If you are not already someone with an extensive collection of other
+developers' public keys, then you can jumpstart your keyring by relying
+on key auto-discovery and auto-retrieval. GnuPG can piggyback on other
+delegated trust technologies, namely DNSSEC and TLS, to get you going if
+the prospect of starting your own Web of Trust from scratch is too
+daunting.
+
+Add the following to your ``~/.gnupg/gpg.conf``::
+
+ auto-key-locate wkd,dane,local
+ auto-key-retrieve
+
+DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities ("DANE") is a method for
+publishing public keys in DNS and securing them using DNSSEC signed
+zones. Web Key Directory ("WKD") is the alternative method that uses
+https lookups for the same purpose. When using either DANE or WKD for
+looking up public keys, GnuPG will validate DNSSEC or TLS certificates,
+respectively, before adding auto-retrieved public keys to your local
+keyring.
+
+Kernel.org publishes the WKD for all developers who have kernel.org
+accounts. Once you have the above changes in your ``gpg.conf``, you can
+auto-retrieve the keys for Linus Torvalds and Greg Kroah-Hartman (if you
+don't already have them)::
+
+ $ gpg --locate-keys torvalds@...nel.org gregkh@...nel.org
+
+If you have a kernel.org account, then you should `add the kernel.org
+UID to your key`_ to make WKD more useful to other kernel developers.
+
+.. _`add the kernel.org UID to your key`: https://korg.wiki.kernel.org/userdoc/mail#adding_a_kernelorg_uid_to_your_pgp_key
+
+Web of Trust (WOT) vs. Trust on First Use (TOFU)
+------------------------------------------------
+
+PGP incorporates a trust delegation mechanism known as the "Web of
+Trust." At its core, this is an attempt to replace the need for
+centralized Certification Authorities of the HTTPS/TLS world. Instead of
+various software makers dictating who should be your trusted certifying
+entity, PGP leaves this responsibility to each user.
+
+Unfortunately, very few people understand how the Web of Trust works.
+While it remains an important aspect of the OpenPGP specification,
+recent versions of GnuPG (2.2 and above) have implemented an alternative
+mechanism called "Trust on First Use" (TOFU). You can think of TOFU as
+"the SSH-like approach to trust." With SSH, the first time you connect
+to a remote system, its key fingerprint is recorded and remembered. If
+the key changes in the future, the SSH client will alert you and refuse
+to connect, forcing you to make a decision on whether you choose to
+trust the changed key or not. Similarly, the first time you import
+someone's PGP key, it is assumed to be valid. If at any point in the
+future GnuPG comes across another key with the same identity, both the
+previously imported key and the new key will be marked as invalid and
+you will need to manually figure out which one to keep.
+
+We recommend that you use the combined TOFU+PGP trust model (which is
+the new default in GnuPG v2). To set it, add (or modify) the
+``trust-model`` setting in ``~/.gnupg/gpg.conf``::
+
+ trust-model tofu+pgp
+
+How to use keyservers (more) safely
+-----------------------------------
+
+If you get a "No public key" error when trying to validate someone's
+tag, then you should attempt to lookup that key using a keyserver. It is
+important to keep in mind that there is absolutely no guarantee that the
+key you retrieve from PGP keyservers belongs to the actual person --
+that much is by design. You are supposed to use the Web of Trust to
+establish key validity.
+
+How to properly maintain the Web of Trust is beyond the scope of this
+document, simply because doing it properly requires both effort and
+dedication that tends to be beyond the caring threshold of most human
+beings. Here are some shortcuts that will help you reduce the risk of
+importing a malicious key.
+
+First, let's say you've tried to run ``git verify-tag`` but it returned
+an error saying the key is not found::
+
+ $ git verify-tag sunxi-fixes-for-4.15-2
+ gpg: Signature made Sun 07 Jan 2018 10:51:55 PM EST
+ gpg: using RSA key DA73759BF8619E484E5A3B47389A54219C0F2430
+ gpg: issuer "wens@...org"
+ gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
+
+Let's query the keyserver for more info about that key fingerprint (the
+fingerprint probably belongs to a subkey, so we can't use it directly
+without finding out the ID of the master key it is associated with)::
+
+ $ gpg --search DA73759BF8619E484E5A3B47389A54219C0F2430
+ gpg: data source: hkp://keys.gnupg.net
+ (1) Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@...org>
+ 4096 bit RSA key C94035C21B4F2AEB, created: 2017-03-14, expires: 2019-03-15
+ Keys 1-1 of 1 for "DA73759BF8619E484E5A3B47389A54219C0F2430". Enter number(s), N)ext, or Q)uit > q
+
+Locate the ID of the master key in the output, in our example
+``C94035C21B4F2AEB``. Now display the key of Linus Torvalds that you
+have on your keyring::
+
+ $ git --list-key torvalds@...nel.org
+ pub rsa2048 2011-09-20 [SC]
+ ABAF11C65A2970B130ABE3C479BE3E4300411886
+ uid [ unknown] Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...nel.org>
+ sub rsa2048 2011-09-20 [E]
+
+Next, open the `PGP pathfinder`_. In the "From" field, paste the key
+fingerprint of Linus Torvalds from the output above. In the "To" field,
+paste they key-id you found via ``gpg --search`` of the unknown key, and
+check the results:
+
+- `Finding paths to Linus`_
+
+If you get a few decent trust paths, then it's a pretty good indication
+that it is a valid key. You can add it to your keyring from the
+keyserver now::
+
+ $ gpg --recv-key C94035C21B4F2AEB
+
+This process is not perfect, and you are obviously trusting the
+administrators of the PGP Pathfinder service to not be malicious.
+However, if you do not carefully maintain your own web of trust, then it
+is an improvement over blindly trusting keyservers.
+
+.. _`PGP pathfinder`: https://pgp.cs.uu.nl/
+.. _`Finding paths to Linus`: https://pgp.cs.uu.nl/paths/79BE3E4300411886/to/C94035C21B4F2AEB.html
+
+
+Maintainer: Konstantin Ryabitsev <konstantin@...uxfoundation.org>
--
2.14.3
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