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Message-ID: <tip-edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360@git.kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 14:38:29 -0800
From: tip-bot for Dan Williams <tipbot@...or.com>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: jslaby@...e.cz, dan.j.williams@...el.com, mingo@...nel.org,
hpa@...or.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, tglx@...utronix.de
Subject: [tip:x86/pti] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for
spectre_v1
Commit-ID: edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360
Author: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
AuthorDate: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:03:21 -0800
Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
CommitDate: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 21:54:32 +0100
x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections
in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the
kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim
mitigation for __user pointer de-references.
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@...r.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@...uxfoundation.org
Cc: torvalds@...ux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@...ux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 400c34e..fdb6068 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
- return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
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