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Message-ID: <20180222184428.yby6usf4b5pd6nrw@dwarf.suse.cz>
Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 19:44:28 +0100
From: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@...e.cz>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, jforbes@...hat.com,
linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 04/30] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked
down
On Thu, Feb 22, 2018 at 01:07:57PM +0000, David Howells wrote:
> I'm considering folding the attached changes into this patch.
>
> It adjusts the errors generated:
>
> (1) If there's no signature (ENODATA) or we can't check it (ENOPKG, ENOKEY),
> then:
>
> (a) If signatures are enforced then EKEYREJECTED is returned.
>
> (b) If IMA will have validated the image, return 0 (okay).
>
> (c) If there's no signature or we can't check it, but the kernel is
> locked down then EPERM is returned (this is then consistent with
> other lockdown cases).
>
> (2) If the signature is unparseable (EBADMSG, EINVAL), the signature fails
> the check (EKEYREJECTED) or a system error occurs (eg. ENOMEM), we return
> the error we got.
>
> Note that the X.509 code doesn't check for key expiry as the RTC might not be
> valid or might not have been transferred to the kernel's clock yet.
Looks good.
Reviewed-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@...e.cz>
--
Jiri Bohac <jbohac@...e.cz>
SUSE Labs, Prague, Czechia
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