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Message-ID: <20180222190814.a5mavnqvii5i6ptf@dwarf.suse.cz>
Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 20:08:14 +0100
From: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@...e.cz>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk,
linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
jforbes@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is
locked down
On Thu, Feb 22, 2018 at 02:20:43PM +0000, David Howells wrote:
> commit 87a39b258eca2e15884ee90c3fcd5758d6057b17
> Author: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
> Date: Thu Feb 22 13:42:04 2018 +0000
>
> kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
>
> This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown. A locked down
> kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images to be loaded with
s/to be loaded/from being loaded/
(my own mistake :-))
Otherwise looks good. Thanks for improving my idea.
Reviewed-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@...e.cz>
--
Jiri Bohac <jbohac@...e.cz>
SUSE Labs, Prague, Czechia
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