linux-kernel - Re: [RFC][PATCH 08/10] x86/mm: do not forbid _PAGE_RW before init for __ro_after

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+1e8dnSWgg8oF1FS_EBhuHqPe3r5MzrCdFgE4bD_9a5Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 22 Feb 2018 12:53:06 -0800
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>
To:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc:     LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        namit@...are.com
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 08/10] x86/mm: do not forbid _PAGE_RW before init for __ro_after_init

On Thu, Feb 22, 2018 at 12:37 PM, Dave Hansen
<dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
>
> __ro_after_init data gets stuck in the .rodata section.  That's normally
> fine because the kernel itself manages the R/W properties.
>
> But, if we run __change_page_attr() on an area which is __ro_after_init,
> the .rodata checks will trigger and force the area to be immediately
> read-only, even if it is early-ish in boot.  This caused problems when
> trying to clear the _PAGE_GLOBAL bit for these area in the PTI code:
> it cleared _PAGE_GLOBAL like I asked, but also took it up on itself
> to clear _PAGE_RW.  The kernel then oopses the next time it wrote to
> a __ro_after_init data structure.
>
> To fix this, add the kernel_set_to_readonly check, just like we have
> for kernel text, just a few lines below in this function.

Yup, looks sensible. Thanks!

>
> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>
> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>
> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
> Cc: x86@...nel.org
> Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>

Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>
>  b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c |    6 ++++--
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff -puN arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c~check-kernel_set_to_readonly arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c~check-kernel_set_to_readonly       2018-02-22 12:36:21.531036546 -0800
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c    2018-02-22 12:36:21.535036546 -0800
> @@ -298,9 +298,11 @@ static inline pgprot_t static_protection
>
>         /*
>          * The .rodata section needs to be read-only. Using the pfn
> -        * catches all aliases.
> +        * catches all aliases.  This also includes __ro_after_init,
> +        * so do not enforce until kernel_set_to_readonly is true.
>          */
> -       if (within(pfn, __pa_symbol(__start_rodata) >> PAGE_SHIFT,
> +       if (kernel_set_to_readonly &&
> +           within(pfn, __pa_symbol(__start_rodata) >> PAGE_SHIFT,
>                    __pa_symbol(__end_rodata) >> PAGE_SHIFT))
>                 pgprot_val(forbidden) |= _PAGE_RW;
>
> _



-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security