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Message-ID: <93613F56-C778-4EA0-8945-A0B8ABC1A5FD@vmware.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 21:27:31 +0000
From: Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
CC: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"aarcange@...hat.com" <aarcange@...hat.com>,
"luto@...nel.org" <luto@...nel.org>,
"torvalds@...ux-foundation.org" <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
"keescook@...gle.com" <keescook@...gle.com>,
"hughd@...gle.com" <hughd@...gle.com>,
"jgross@...e.com" <jgross@...e.com>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 04/10] x86/espfix: use kernel-default PTE mask
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
>
> In creating its page tables, the espfix code masks its PGTABLE_PROT
> value with the supported mask: __supported_pte_mask. This ensures
> that unsupported bits are not set in the final PTE. But, it also
> sets _PAGE_GLOBAL which we do not want for PTE. Use
> __default_kernel_pte_mask instead which clears _PAGE_GLOBAL for PTI.
Can you please explain what is your concern? Exposing more gadgets for
speculative ROP attacks?
Or is it a general rule of not exposing any kernel code &data more than
absolutely necessary?
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