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Message-ID: <20180301213205.GB29001@flask>
Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2018 22:39:04 +0100
From: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@...zon.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: VMX: expose the host's ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR to
userspace
[Resent after removing g@...r.us.oracle.com.]
2018-02-26 17:13-0500, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk:
> On Sat, Feb 24, 2018 at 01:52:26AM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > Use the new MSR feature framework to expose the ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR to
> > userspace. This way, userspace can access the capabilities even if it
> > does not have the permissions to read MSRs.
>
> ... That is good but could you expand a bit of why it would want this?
>
> I am 99% sure it is due to the lovely spectre_v2 mitigation but
> could you include that in the commit message so that in say a year
> folks would know what this is?
Userspace can currently get the MSR by creating a VCPU and reading its
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, because it is set from the hardware MSR.
I thought that "permissions to read MSRs" talked about hardware MSRs, so
the purpose of this patch would be a better interface, but I don't see
how if we keep the auto-setting on VCPU creation.
Is this aimed towards userspaces that want nothing else from KVM than
the MSR value?
Thanks.
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