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Message-ID: <ccead1df-ba70-f365-c816-7892834a290c@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2018 10:36:23 +0100
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@...zon.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: VMX: expose the host's ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR to
userspace
On 01/03/2018 22:39, Radim Krčmář wrote:
> [Resent after removing g@...r.us.oracle.com.]
>
> 2018-02-26 17:13-0500, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk:
>> On Sat, Feb 24, 2018 at 01:52:26AM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>>> Use the new MSR feature framework to expose the ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR to
>>> userspace. This way, userspace can access the capabilities even if it
>>> does not have the permissions to read MSRs.
>>
>> ... That is good but could you expand a bit of why it would want this?
>>
>> I am 99% sure it is due to the lovely spectre_v2 mitigation but
>> could you include that in the commit message so that in say a year
>> folks would know what this is?
>
> Userspace can currently get the MSR by creating a VCPU and reading its
> MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, because it is set from the hardware MSR.
>
> I thought that "permissions to read MSRs" talked about hardware MSRs, so
> the purpose of this patch would be a better interface, but I don't see
> how if we keep the auto-setting on VCPU creation.
Yeah, it's mostly about a better interface and being able to do checks
before creating the VCPU. The commit message was written before I
noticed the auto-setting on VCPU creation, and I failed to update it.
Thanks,
Paolo
> Is this aimed towards userspaces that want nothing else from KVM than
> the MSR value?
>
> Thanks.
>
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