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Message-ID: <20180420072903.GA594@jagdpanzerIV>
Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2018 16:29:03 +0900
From: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@...il.com>
To: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@...il.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
Andrey Vagin <avagin@...nvz.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...uxfoundation.org>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...tuozzo.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Yang Shi <yang.shi@...ux.alibaba.com>
Subject: Re: [v2] prctl: Deprecate non PR_SET_MM_MAP operations
On (04/20/18 10:02), Cyrill Gorcunov wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 20, 2018 at 11:38:09AM +0900, Sergey Senozhatsky wrote:
> > On (04/05/18 21:26), Cyrill Gorcunov wrote:
> > [..]
> > > -
> > > #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
> > > if (opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP || opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE)
> > > return prctl_set_mm_map(opt, (const void __user *)addr, arg4);
> > > #endif
> > >
> > > - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
> > > - return -EPERM;
> > > -
> > > - if (opt == PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE)
> > > - return prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, (unsigned int)addr);
> > > -
> > > - if (opt == PR_SET_MM_AUXV)
> > > - return prctl_set_auxv(mm, addr, arg4);
> >
> > Then validate_prctl_map() and prctl_set_mm_exe_file() can be moved
> > under CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE ifdef.
>
> I don't mind. Could you please make the patch on top of linux-next?
As far as I can see, it's not in linux-next yet. So the following is
against the mmots tree. I wouldn't mind it if we could just squash the
patches.
=======================================================================
From: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH] prctl: Don't compile some of prctl functions when CRUI
disabled
CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is the only user of validate_prctl_map()
and prctl_set_mm_exe_file(), so we can move those two under
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>
---
kernel/sys.c | 126 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 6bdffe264303..86e5ef1a5612 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1815,68 +1815,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(umask, int, mask)
return mask;
}
-static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd)
-{
- struct fd exe;
- struct file *old_exe, *exe_file;
- struct inode *inode;
- int err;
-
- exe = fdget(fd);
- if (!exe.file)
- return -EBADF;
-
- inode = file_inode(exe.file);
-
- /*
- * Because the original mm->exe_file points to executable file, make
- * sure that this one is executable as well, to avoid breaking an
- * overall picture.
- */
- err = -EACCES;
- if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || path_noexec(&exe.file->f_path))
- goto exit;
-
- err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
- if (err)
- goto exit;
-
- /*
- * Forbid mm->exe_file change if old file still mapped.
- */
- exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(mm);
- err = -EBUSY;
- if (exe_file) {
- struct vm_area_struct *vma;
-
- down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
- for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
- if (!vma->vm_file)
- continue;
- if (path_equal(&vma->vm_file->f_path,
- &exe_file->f_path))
- goto exit_err;
- }
-
- up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
- fput(exe_file);
- }
-
- err = 0;
- /* set the new file, lockless */
- get_file(exe.file);
- old_exe = xchg(&mm->exe_file, exe.file);
- if (old_exe)
- fput(old_exe);
-exit:
- fdput(exe);
- return err;
-exit_err:
- up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
- fput(exe_file);
- goto exit;
-}
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
/*
* WARNING: we don't require any capability here so be very careful
* in what is allowed for modification from userspace.
@@ -1968,7 +1907,68 @@ static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map)
return error;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
+static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd)
+{
+ struct fd exe;
+ struct file *old_exe, *exe_file;
+ struct inode *inode;
+ int err;
+
+ exe = fdget(fd);
+ if (!exe.file)
+ return -EBADF;
+
+ inode = file_inode(exe.file);
+
+ /*
+ * Because the original mm->exe_file points to executable file, make
+ * sure that this one is executable as well, to avoid breaking an
+ * overall picture.
+ */
+ err = -EACCES;
+ if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || path_noexec(&exe.file->f_path))
+ goto exit;
+
+ err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
+ if (err)
+ goto exit;
+
+ /*
+ * Forbid mm->exe_file change if old file still mapped.
+ */
+ exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(mm);
+ err = -EBUSY;
+ if (exe_file) {
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+
+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
+ if (!vma->vm_file)
+ continue;
+ if (path_equal(&vma->vm_file->f_path,
+ &exe_file->f_path))
+ goto exit_err;
+ }
+
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ fput(exe_file);
+ }
+
+ err = 0;
+ /* set the new file, lockless */
+ get_file(exe.file);
+ old_exe = xchg(&mm->exe_file, exe.file);
+ if (old_exe)
+ fput(old_exe);
+exit:
+ fdput(exe);
+ return err;
+exit_err:
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ fput(exe_file);
+ goto exit;
+}
+
static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long data_size)
{
struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = { .exe_fd = (u32)-1, };
--
2.17.0
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