linux-kernel - Re: BUG: /proc/kcore does not export direct-mapped memory on arm64 (and presumably some other architectures)

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+3LpvTk49p8o4oBiS3e=3UBAqL5oHzBZB1i9AegvMmDg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 26 Apr 2018 14:16:11 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Dave Anderson <anderson@...hat.com>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
        Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>
Cc:     Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>
Subject: Re: BUG: /proc/kcore does not export direct-mapped memory on arm64
 (and presumably some other architectures)

On Thu, Apr 26, 2018 at 12:31 PM, Dave Anderson <anderson@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> While testing /proc/kcore as the live memory source for the crash utility,
> it fails on arm64.  The failure on arm64 occurs because only the
> vmalloc/module space segments are exported in PT_LOAD segments,
> and it's missing all of the PT_LOAD segments for the generic
> unity-mapped regions of physical memory, as well as their associated
> vmemmap sections.
>
> The mapping of unity-mapped RAM segments in fs/proc/kcore.c is
> architecture-neutral, and after debugging it, I found this as the
> problem.  For each chunk of physical memory, kcore_update_ram()
> calls walk_system_ram_range(), passing kclist_add_private() as a
> callback function to add the chunk to the kclist, and eventually
> leading to the creation of a PT_LOAD segment.
>
> kclist_add_private() does some verification of the memory region,
> but this one below is bogus for arm64:
>
>     static int
>     kclist_add_private(unsigned long pfn, unsigned long nr_pages, void *arg)
>     {
>     ... [ cut ] ...
>             ent->addr = (unsigned long)__va((pfn << PAGE_SHIFT));
>     ... [ cut ] ...
>
>             /* Sanity check: Can happen in 32bit arch...maybe */
>             if (ent->addr < (unsigned long) __va(0))
>                     goto free_out;
>
> And that's because __va(0) is a bogus check for arm64.  It is checking
> whether the ent->addr value is less than the lowest possible unity-mapped
> address.  But "0" should not be used as a physical address on arm64; the
> lowest legitimate physical address for this __va() check would be the arm64
> PHYS_OFFSET, or memstart_addr:
>
> Here's the arm64 __va() and PHYS_OFFSET:
>
>   #define __va(x) ((void *)__phys_to_virt((phys_addr_t)(x)))
>   #define __phys_to_virt(x)       ((unsigned long)((x) - PHYS_OFFSET) | PAGE_OFFSET)
>
>   extern s64                      memstart_addr;
>   /* PHYS_OFFSET - the physical address of the start of memory. */
>   #define PHYS_OFFSET             ({ VM_BUG_ON(memstart_addr & 1); memstart_addr; })
>
> If PHYS_OFFSET/memstart_addr is anything other than 0 (it is 0x4000000000 on my
> test system), the __va(0) calculation goes negative and creates a bogus, very
> large, virtual address.  And since the ent->addr virtual address is less than
> bogus __va(0) address, the test fails, and the memory chunk is rejected.
>
> Looking at the kernel sources, it seems that this would affect other
> architectures as well, i.e., the ones whose __va() is not a simple
> addition of the physical address with PAGE_OFFSET.
>
> Anyway, I don't know what the best approach for an architecture-neutral
> fix would be in this case.  So I figured I'd throw it out to you guys for
> some ideas.

I'm not as familiar with this code, but I've added Ard and Laura to CC
here, as this feels like something they'd be able to comment on. :)

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security