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Message-Id: <20180510072559.21cf860390f62bfc195ae959@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 07:25:59 +0900
From: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
francis.deslauriers@...icios.com,
Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@...ux.intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>, Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] uprobes: x86: Reject probing MOV SS
On Wed, 09 May 2018 14:36:27 +0000
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
> On Wed, May 9, 2018 at 5:58 AM Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org> wrote:
>
> > Hi,
>
> > I found the CVE-2018-1087 and CVE-2018-8897 should
> > be related to kprobes and uprobes too, since both
> > are using #DB for single stepping.
>
>
> Seems okay to me. I doubt we have a security problem, but I can easily
> imagine that the probes wouldn't work right.
Sorry for confusion, yes, that will not be a security issue, since kprobes
and uprobes can be used only by root user.
Thank you,
--
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>
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