linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v5 7/7] proc: add option to mount only a pids subset

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Date:   Fri, 11 May 2018 15:58:39 +0200
From:   Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
To:     Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>
Cc:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
        linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@...il.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
        Jeff Layton <jlayton@...chiereds.net>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        aniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, bfields@...ldses.org,
        Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>,
        Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>,
        "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@...linux.org>,
        Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 7/7] proc: add option to mount only a pids subset

On Fri, May 11, 2018 at 11:37 AM, Alexey Gladkov
<gladkov.alexey@...il.com> wrote:
> This allows to hide all files and directories in the procfs that are not
> related to tasks.

/proc/$pid/net and /proc/$pid/task/$tid/net aren't in scope for this
protection, even though they contain information about the whole
network namespace of the task, right?