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Message-ID: <f462c3eb-88e4-829c-132a-e55eb6ef6f19@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 15 May 2018 09:15:16 -0700
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...ux.intel.com>,
Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>,
Ravi V Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Rafael Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: x86 <x86@...nel.org>, linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 09/15] x86/split_lock: Explicitly enable or disable #AC
for split locked accesses
On 05/14/2018 11:52 AM, Fenghua Yu wrote:
> By default, we don't set or clear the bit 29 in TEST_CTL MSR 0x33 and
> the bit is inherited from BIOS/hardware setting.
>
> The kernel parameter "split_lock_ac=on/off" explicitly sets or clears
> the bit during boot time.
The more I think about this... Why do we need this at boot anyway?
Surely boot-time kernel code can't cause performance issues in the same
way that untrusted repeated userspace can. Why don't we just let
userspace turn this on?
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