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Message-ID: <20180523162741.GU12198@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Wed, 23 May 2018 18:27:41 +0200
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel: sys: fix potential Spectre v1
On Wed, May 23, 2018 at 04:07:37PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> I think that either way, we have a potential problem if the compiler
> generates a branch dependent on the result of validate_index_nospec().
>
> In that case, we could end up with codegen approximating:
>
> bool safe = false;
>
> if (idx < bound) {
> idx = array_index_nospec(idx, bound);
> safe = true;
> }
>
> // this branch can be mispredicted
> if (safe) {
> foo = array[idx];
> }
>
> ... and thus we lose the nospec protection.
I was assuming the compiler would not do that, that's pretty stupid
code-gen. But you're right in calling that out, because I think it's
entirely in it's right to do that :/
> I also suspect that compiler transformations mean that this might
> already be the case for patterns like:
>
> if (idx < bound) {
> safe_idx = array_index_nospec(idx, bound)];
> ...
> foo = array[safe_idx];
> }
>
> ... if the compiler can transform that to something like:
>
> if (idx < bound) {
> idx = array_index_nospec(idx, bound);
> }
>
> // can be mispredicted
> if (idx < bound) {
> foo = array[idx];
> }
>
> ... which I think a compiler might be capable of, depending on the rest
> of the function body (e.g. if there's a common portion shared with the
> else case).
>
> I'll see if I can trigger that in a test case. :/
*groan*...
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