[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <02d9878e-65bf-5de8-9658-cf0f692f358c@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Jun 2018 09:22:28 -0700
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: chandan.vn@...sung.com, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>
Cc: "gregkh@...uxfoundation.org" <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
"bfields@...ldses.org" <bfields@...ldses.org>,
"jlayton@...nel.org" <jlayton@...nel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org" <linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org>,
CPGS <cpgs@...sung.com>,
Sireesha Talluri <sireesha.t@...sung.com>,
Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] Fix memory leak in kernfs_security_xattr_set and
kernfs_security_xattr_set
On 6/1/2018 1:56 AM, CHANDAN VN wrote:
> Hi
>
>
>> On 5/31/2018 9:11 AM, Tejun Heo wrote:
>> On Thu, May 31, 2018 at 09:04:25AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>> On 5/31/2018 8:39 AM, Tejun Heo wrote:
>>>>> (cc'ing more security folks and copying whole body)
>>>>>
>>>>> So, I'm sure the patch fixes the memory leak but API wise it looks
>>>>> super confusing. Can security folks chime in here? Is this the right
>>>>> fix?
>>>>> security_inode_getsecctx() provides a security context. Technically,
>>>>> this is a data blob, although both provider provide a null terminated
>>>>> string. security_inode_getsecurity(), on the other hand, provides a
>>>>> string to match an attribute name. The former releases the security
>>>>> context with security_release_secctx(), where the later releases the
>>>>> string with kfree().
>>>>>
>>>>> When the Smack hook smack_inode_getsecctx() was added in 2009
>>>>> for use by labeled NFS the alloc value passed to
>>>> smack_inode_getsecurity() was set incorrectly. This wasn't a
>>>> major issue, since labeled NFS is a fringe case. When kernfs
>>>> started using the hook, it became the issue you discovered.
>>>>
>>>> The reason that we have all this confusion is that SELinux
>>>> generates security contexts as needed, while Smack keeps them
>>>> around all the time. Releasing an SELinux context frees memory,
>>>> while releasing a Smack context is a null operation.
>>> Any chance this detail can be hidden behind security api? This looks
>>> pretty error-prone, no?
>
>>> It *is* hidden behind the security API. The problem is strictly
>>> within the Smack code, where the implementer of smack_inode_getsecctx()
>>> made an error.
> I agree that the fix can be done simply by using "false" for
> smack_inode_getsecurity(), but what happens with kernfs_node_setsecdata()
> and smack_inode_notifysecctx(). kernfs_node_setsecdata() is probably ignorable
> but smack_inode_notifysecctx() is sending the "ctx" to smack_inode_setsecurity()
> and since "ctx" would be NULL because we used "false", smack_inode_setsecurity()
> becomes dummy.
Thank you for pointing this out. You're right, there's more
at issue here than changing the alloc flag will fix. I think
that calling smack_inode_getsecurity() from smack_inode_getsecctx()
is making the code more complicated than it needs to be. I will
have a patch shortly.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists