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Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2018 15:00:11 -0500 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, "Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@...nel.org>, Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, kexec@...ts.infradead.org, Andres Rodriguez <andresx7@...il.com>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/8] kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com): > In order for LSMs and IMA-appraisal to differentiate between kexec_load > and kexec_file_load syscalls, both the original and new syscalls must > call an LSM hook. This patch adds a call to security_kernel_load_data() > in the original kexec_load syscall. > > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> > Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com> > Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@...nel.org> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> > Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> > --- > kernel/kexec.c | 8 ++++++++ > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c > index aed8fb2564b3..68559808fdfa 100644 > --- a/kernel/kexec.c > +++ b/kernel/kexec.c > @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ > #include <linux/capability.h> > #include <linux/mm.h> > #include <linux/file.h> > +#include <linux/security.h> > #include <linux/kexec.h> > #include <linux/mutex.h> > #include <linux/list.h> > @@ -195,10 +196,17 @@ static int do_kexec_load(unsigned long entry, unsigned long nr_segments, > static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments, > unsigned long flags) > { > + int result; > + > /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ > if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) > return -EPERM; > > + /* Permit LSMs and IMA to fail the kexec */ > + result = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE); > + if (result < 0) > + return result; > + > /* > * Verify we have a legal set of flags > * This leaves us room for future extensions. > -- > 2.7.5
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