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Message-ID: <1528815781.8271.15.camel@2b52.sc.intel.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 08:03:01 -0700
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
To: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/10] x86/cet: User-mode shadow stack support
On Tue, 2018-06-12 at 21:56 +1000, Balbir Singh wrote:
>
> On 08/06/18 00:37, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> > This patch adds basic shadow stack enabling/disabling routines.
> > A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHSTK
> > flag set and read-only protection. The shadow stack is
> > allocated to a fixed size and that can be changed by the system
> > admin.
> >
>
> I presume a read-only permission on the kernel side, but it
> can be written by hardware?
Yes, the shadow stack is written by the processor when a call
instruction is executed.
...
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..9d5bc1efc9b7
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> > @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
> > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> > +#ifndef _ASM_X86_CET_H
> > +#define _ASM_X86_CET_H
> > +
> > +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
> > +#include <linux/types.h>
> > +
> > +struct task_struct;
> > +/*
> > + * Per-thread CET status
> > + */
> > +struct cet_stat {
>
> stat sounds like statistics, just expand out to status please
I will make it 'cet_status'.
> > + unsigned long shstk_base;
> > + unsigned long shstk_size;
> > + unsigned int shstk_enabled:1;
> > +};
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
> > +unsigned long cet_get_shstk_ptr(void);
>
> For the current task? Why does _ptr routine return an unsigned long?
What about cet_get_shstk_addr()?
...
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> > index fda2114197b3..428d13828ba9 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> > @@ -770,4 +770,18 @@
> > #define MSR_VM_IGNNE 0xc0010115
> > #define MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA 0xc0010117
> >
> > +/* Control-flow Enforcement Technology MSRs */
> > +#define MSR_IA32_U_CET 0x6a0
> > +#define MSR_IA32_S_CET 0x6a2
> > +#define MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP 0x6a4
> > +#define MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP 0x6a7
> > +#define MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB 0x6a8
>
> some comments on the purpose of the MSR would be nice
Sure.
...
>
> I think there was a comment about this being TASK_SIZE_MAX
>
> > +
> > + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
> > + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r | MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN);
> > + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr);
>
> Should the enable happen before setting addr? I would expect to do this in the opposite order.
I will check.
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +unsigned long cet_get_shstk_ptr(void)
> > +{
> > + unsigned long ptr;
> > +
> > + if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ptr);
> > + return ptr;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static unsigned long shstk_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
> > +{
> > + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
> > + unsigned long populate;
> > +
> > + down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
> > + addr = do_mmap(NULL, addr, len, PROT_READ,
> > + MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, VM_SHSTK,
> > + 0, &populate, NULL);
> > + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
>
> What happens if the mmap fails for any reason? I presume the caller disables shadow stack on this process?
This is from exec(), and that fails.
> > +
> > + if (populate)
> > + mm_populate(addr, populate);
> > +
> > + return addr;
> > +}
> > +
> > +int cet_setup_shstk(void)
> > +{
> > + unsigned long addr, size;
> > +
> > + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> > + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > +
> > + size = SHSTK_SIZE;
> > + addr = shstk_mmap(0, size);
> > +
> > + if (addr >= TASK_SIZE)
> > + return -ENOMEM;
> > +
>
> TASK_SIZE_MAX?
Yes.
>
> > + cet_set_shstk_ptr(addr + size - sizeof(void *));
> > + current->thread.cet.shstk_base = addr;
> > + current->thread.cet.shstk_size = size;
> > + current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 1;
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +void cet_disable_shstk(void)
> > +{
> > + u64 r;
> > +
> > + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> > + return;
> > +
> > + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
> > + r &= ~(MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN);
> > + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
> > + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0);
>
> Again, I'd expect the order to be the reverse
>
> > + current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > +{
> > + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
> > + !tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
> > + return;
> > +
> > + if (tsk == current)
> > + cet_disable_shstk();
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Free only when tsk is current or shares mm
> > + * with current but has its own shstk.
> > + */
> > + if (tsk->mm && (tsk->mm == current->mm) &&
> > + (tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base)) {
>
> Does the caller hold a reference to tsk->mm?
If (tsk->mm == current->mm), i.e. it is current or it is a pthread of
current, then yes.
Yu-cheng
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