| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <0e80c181-83b2-457f-a419-01e79f94ca1c@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 21:56:37 +1000
From: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/10] x86/cet: User-mode shadow stack support
On 08/06/18 00:37, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> This patch adds basic shadow stack enabling/disabling routines.
> A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHSTK
> flag set and read-only protection. The shadow stack is
> allocated to a fixed size and that can be changed by the system
> admin.
>
I presume a read-only permission on the kernel side, but it
can be written by hardware?
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 32 ++++++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 14 ++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 ++
> arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 +
> arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 123 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 24 ++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +
> fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 +
> 9 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..9d5bc1efc9b7
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +#ifndef _ASM_X86_CET_H
> +#define _ASM_X86_CET_H
> +
> +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +
> +struct task_struct;
> +/*
> + * Per-thread CET status
> + */
> +struct cet_stat {
stat sounds like statistics, just expand out to status please
> + unsigned long shstk_base;
> + unsigned long shstk_size;
> + unsigned int shstk_enabled:1;
> +};
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
> +unsigned long cet_get_shstk_ptr(void);
For the current task? Why does _ptr routine return an unsigned long?
> +int cet_setup_shstk(void);
> +void cet_disable_shstk(void);
> +void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
> +#else
> +static inline unsigned long cet_get_shstk_ptr(void) { return 0; }
> +static inline int cet_setup_shstk(void) { return 0; }
> +static inline void cet_disable_shstk(void) {}
> +static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {}
> +#endif
> +
> +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
> +
> +#endif /* _ASM_X86_CET_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> index 33833d1909af..3624a11e5ba6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> @@ -56,6 +56,12 @@
> # define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
> #endif
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
> +#define DISABLE_SHSTK 0
> +#else
> +#define DISABLE_SHSTK (1<<(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * Make sure to add features to the correct mask
> */
> @@ -75,7 +81,7 @@
> #define DISABLED_MASK13 0
> #define DISABLED_MASK14 0
> #define DISABLED_MASK15 0
> -#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP)
> +#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP|DISABLE_SHSTK)
> #define DISABLED_MASK17 0
> #define DISABLED_MASK18 0
> #define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> index fda2114197b3..428d13828ba9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> @@ -770,4 +770,18 @@
> #define MSR_VM_IGNNE 0xc0010115
> #define MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA 0xc0010117
>
> +/* Control-flow Enforcement Technology MSRs */
> +#define MSR_IA32_U_CET 0x6a0
> +#define MSR_IA32_S_CET 0x6a2
> +#define MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP 0x6a4
> +#define MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP 0x6a7
> +#define MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB 0x6a8
some comments on the purpose of the MSR would be nice
> +
> +/* MSR_IA32_U_CET and MSR_IA32_S_CET bits */
> +#define MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN 0x0000000000000001
> +#define MSR_IA32_CET_WRSS_EN 0x0000000000000002
> +#define MSR_IA32_CET_ENDBR_EN 0x0000000000000004
> +#define MSR_IA32_CET_LEG_IW_EN 0x0000000000000008
> +#define MSR_IA32_CET_NO_TRACK_EN 0x0000000000000010
> +
Same as above
> #endif /* _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> index 21a114914ba4..e632dd7adaac 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ struct vm86;
> #include <asm/special_insns.h>
> #include <asm/fpu/types.h>
> #include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
> +#include <asm/cet.h>
>
> #include <linux/personality.h>
> #include <linux/cache.h>
> @@ -507,6 +508,10 @@ struct thread_struct {
> unsigned int sig_on_uaccess_err:1;
> unsigned int uaccess_err:1; /* uaccess failed */
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
> + struct cet_stat cet;
> +#endif
> +
> /* Floating point and extended processor state */
> struct fpu fpu;
> /*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> index 02d6f5cf4e70..7ea5e099d558 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> @@ -138,6 +138,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) += unwind_orc.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o
>
> +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET) += cet.o
> +
> ###
> # 64 bit specific files
> ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..8abbfd44322a
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +/*
> + * cet.c - Control Flow Enforcement (CET)
> + *
> + * Copyright (c) 2018, Intel Corporation.
> + * Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/mm.h>
> +#include <linux/mman.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
> +#include <asm/msr.h>
> +#include <asm/user.h>
> +#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
> +#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
> +#include <asm/cet.h>
> +
> +#define SHSTK_SIZE (0x8000 * (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 4 : 8))
> +
> +static inline int cet_set_shstk_ptr(unsigned long addr)
> +{
> + u64 r;
> +
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> + return -1;
> +
> + if ((addr >= TASK_SIZE) || (!IS_ALIGNED(addr, 4)))
> + return -1;
I think there was a comment about this being TASK_SIZE_MAX
> +
> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r | MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN);
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr);
Should the enable happen before setting addr? I would expect to do this in the opposite order.
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +unsigned long cet_get_shstk_ptr(void)
> +{
> + unsigned long ptr;
> +
> + if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
> + return 0;
> +
> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ptr);
> + return ptr;
> +}
> +
> +static unsigned long shstk_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
> +{
> + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
> + unsigned long populate;
> +
> + down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
> + addr = do_mmap(NULL, addr, len, PROT_READ,
> + MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, VM_SHSTK,
> + 0, &populate, NULL);
> + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
What happens if the mmap fails for any reason? I presume the caller disables shadow stack on this process?
> +
> + if (populate)
> + mm_populate(addr, populate);
> +
> + return addr;
> +}
> +
> +int cet_setup_shstk(void)
> +{
> + unsigned long addr, size;
> +
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + size = SHSTK_SIZE;
> + addr = shstk_mmap(0, size);
> +
> + if (addr >= TASK_SIZE)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
TASK_SIZE_MAX?
> + cet_set_shstk_ptr(addr + size - sizeof(void *));
> + current->thread.cet.shstk_base = addr;
> + current->thread.cet.shstk_size = size;
> + current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 1;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +void cet_disable_shstk(void)
> +{
> + u64 r;
> +
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> + return;
> +
> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
> + r &= ~(MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN);
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0);
Again, I'd expect the order to be the reverse
> + current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0;
> +}
> +
> +void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
> + !tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
> + return;
> +
> + if (tsk == current)
> + cet_disable_shstk();
> +
> + /*
> + * Free only when tsk is current or shares mm
> + * with current but has its own shstk.
> + */
> + if (tsk->mm && (tsk->mm == current->mm) &&
> + (tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base)) {
Does the caller hold a reference to tsk->mm?
> + vm_munmap(tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base,
> + tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size);
> + tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base = 0;
> + tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size = 0;
> + }
> +
> + tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0;
> +}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> index 38276f58d3bf..f54fabdaef60 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> @@ -401,6 +401,29 @@ static __init int setup_disable_pku(char *arg)
> __setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku);
> #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
>
> +static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> +{
> + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> + cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_CET);
> +}
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
> +static __init int setup_disable_shstk(char *s)
> +{
> + /* require an exact match without trailing characters */
> + if (strlen(s))
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> + return 1;
> +
> + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
> + pr_info("x86: 'noshstk' specified, disabling Shadow Stack\n");
> + return 1;
> +}
> +__setup("noshstk", setup_disable_shstk);
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always
> * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization
> @@ -1313,6 +1336,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> x86_init_rdrand(c);
> x86_init_cache_qos(c);
> setup_pku(c);
> + setup_cet(c);
>
> /*
> * Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, need do it
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> index 30ca2d1a9231..b3b0b482983a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
> #include <asm/desc.h>
> #include <asm/prctl.h>
> #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
> +#include <asm/cet.h>
>
> /*
> * per-CPU TSS segments. Threads are completely 'soft' on Linux,
> @@ -136,6 +137,7 @@ void flush_thread(void)
> flush_ptrace_hw_breakpoint(tsk);
> memset(tsk->thread.tls_array, 0, sizeof(tsk->thread.tls_array));
>
> + cet_disable_shstk();
> fpu__clear(&tsk->thread.fpu);
> }
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
> index c486ad4b43f0..6aca93ecec0e 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
> @@ -679,6 +679,9 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> [ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT1)] = "",
> [ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT2)] = "",
> [ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT3)] = "",
> +#endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
> + [ilog2(VM_SHSTK)] = "ss"
> #endif
> };
> size_t i;
>
Balbir Singh.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists